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Abstract
This research investigates the anti-forensic aspects of live memory acquisition. In 2009,
the anti-forensic tool Detect and Eliminate Computer Assisted Forensics (DECAF) was
developed to defeat one of the forensic tools, which is well known in the law enforcement
community, Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extrator (COFEE). DECAF uses signature
based detection method to detect forensic tools, and then performs anti-forensic routines
such as modifying evidence, disabling forensic software tools, shutting down the machine
to avoid evidence collection, to name a few. The findings in the literature show that the
signature based method and various anti-forensic methods have shortcomings. This led to
review the application of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, specifically machine learning
algorithms, to the domain of anti-forensics. And, also that AI is not being applied to detect
the live forensic acquisition process. This is the knowledge gap this study has identified
and addressed to the extent that AI techniques can be applied to detect forensic memory
acquisition on a Windows 10, 64-bit machine.
The method that was adopted to address the knowledge gap was by formulating a hypothesis,
that the memory (M), input and output (I/O), and central processing unit (C) parameters
exhibit a distinct variation in MIOC pattern, known as distinctive native attribute (DNA)
pattern or fingerprint, whilst memory is being acquired from the machine by a forensic tool.
If these unique DNA patterns can be identified, then memory acquisition can be detected.
To support the hypothesis of this study, an experiment was conducted to gather MIOC
parameters, and machine learning (ML) algorithms were used to identify the DNA patterns.
viii
The results show that, adaptive (ADA) boost classifier has the least performance with a high
detection error rate (∆r) of 73.4 percent and 89 percent on the memory and CPU dataset
respectively. Whereas, linear discriminant analysis (LDA) classifier has the highest ∆r of 78
percent on the I/O dataset. Random forest (RF) classifier has the least detection rate of less
than 5 percent on the three datasets. To improve the performance of the ML algorithms the
individual memory, I/O, and CPU datasets was integrated into the single MIOC dataset. This
resulted in decreasing ∆r of SVM, LDA, and ADA boost by 32 percent, 17.3 percent, and
ADA 13 percent respectively.
To further support the hypothesis, the MIOC dataset was transformed to images by using the
concept of gramian angular field (GAF). Then, the DNA patterns were detected using the
3-layered convolution neural network (3L-CNN) model. The results show that the model
detects DNA patterns from the I/O dataset with an accuracy, precision, and recall over 99
percent. Whereas, the model underforms on the CPU dataset with an accuracy of 64.94
percent with precision and recall of 69.50 and 44.20 percent respectively. The significance of
DNA fingerprinting detection method is that, it not only shows that AI techniques can be
applied to the anti-forensic domain but also highlights that forensic memory acquisition can
be vulnerable to the DNA fingerprinting method. This implies, if memory acquisition could
be detected using DNA fingerprinting, the process of live memory acquisition is defeated.
Therefore, the investigator will not have crucial evidence to work with that could be found
only in the memory.
Another novel contribution this study makes is by proposing a mathematical formalism
by which a digital forensic model (DFM) can be validated by counteracting the influence
anti-forensic effects on various phases of the digital forensic process. Future work should
focus on addressing live forensic acquisition vulnerabilities.
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IDT Interrupt Descriptor Table. A datastructure for 32-bit OS architecture that implements
a list of interrupts.
Glossary xxiii
ISO 17025 International Standard Organisation 17025. A certification involving testing and
calibration of laboratories.
ISO/IEC 27037 Good practice guidelines for indentification, acquisition, and preservation
of evidence.
ISO/IEC 27043:2015 Good practice guidelines for processes and principles concerning
incident investigation.
memory Also known as the Random Access Memory which stores data until the loss of
power.
MIOC Memory, I/O, and CPU parameters that are acquired in this study to argue and
support the phenomenon of forensic memory detection.
ML Machine Learning. A branch of AI that gives a machine the ability to learn without user
intervention.
precision The proportion of actual instances to the retrieved instances.
RAM Random Access Memory. The volatile memory loses its contents when the power is
turned off from the machine..
recall The percentage of total number of actual instances retrieved.
ReLU Rectified Linear Unit. Also known as rectifier, it is a linear fucntion that outputs the
input if it is positive. Outputs zero otherwise.
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic. A graphical plot of true positive rate and false
positive rate.
SOP Standard Operating Procedure. A set of instructions by an organisation to execute DF
procedures.
xxiv Glossary
SSDT Internal dispatch table for Windows OS containing relative offsets for kernel routines.
TLB Translation Lookaside Buffer. A high speed memory cache for page table entries.




This research focuses on the anti-forensics of the live forensic acquisition process. Digital
Investigation is a process through which digital evidence is examined in an orderly fashion to
infer what had happened previously. The forensic process is guided by the digital forensic
models or good practice guidelines such as Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO),
(Williams, 2012). Anti-forensics (AF) on the other hand, is the process that aims to defeat
digital forensic process. This research proposes a method to detect forensic memory acquisi-
tion and a novel principle to validate digital forensic models by counteracting anti-forensic
attacks.
1.2 Background
Forensics is the application of scientific knowledge to the legal domain, and the application
of a specific scientific area that concerns various scientific disciplines to legal, civil, and
judiciary matters is the domain of forensic science. Digital forensic science is defined as the
use of scientifically proven methods to identify digital evidence to reconstruct events to assist
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an investigation, (Carrier, 2002). During the course of an investigation, when one encounters
electronic devices such as computers, they might find it to be powered on and functioning.
Traditionally, the investigators on the field will pull the power chord off the computer’s
cabinet to shutdown the machine. The advantage of this method is that the operating system
will not have the chance to flush any data back onto the hard drive, and this would mean that
the integrity of the evidence has been preserved at a point in time. However, the volatile data
that is stored in the physical memory, that is, Random Access Memory (RAM), would be
lost if one decides to perform traditional digital forensic methodology to gather evidence
from computers during an investigation (Hay et al., 2009).
The shortcomings of the traditional approach are the situations where it would be impractical
to image a hard drive given its large volume which could extend to more than hundreds and
thousands of terabytes (Quick and Choo, 2014). It may not be possible to take a computer
system down due to business-critical operations such as a server in a financial institution.
Cases where drives are encrypted also pose a threat to an investigation if the encrypted
keys are not obtained prior to imaging the hard drive. Also, criminals who are aware of
the traditional methodology develop malicious software so that they are run only in the
physical memory, and do not leave any traces behind on the hard disk (Reyes et al., 2007).
To overcome the shortcomings of traditional forensics, prior to shutting down the system,
investigators would gather volatile data, or may image the hard drive whilst the machine is
powered on. As for the former case, the investigators would install their known-good tools
on a USB drive or a CD/DVD. These tools then gather specific information from the physical
memory and certain areas of the hard drive depending on the case in hand (Adelstein, 2006).
As the field of digital forensics was progressing during the last two decades, researchers began
to look into ways by which one could defeat the process of digital forensic investigation. They
then termed the methods, techniques, and tools that defeats the process of an investigation
as anti-forensics (Garfinkel, 2006). Anti-forensic methodologies can delay the process of
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an investigation which is known as trial obfuscation, and prevents an investigator to have
access to the evidence. The most popular scenarios include encryption of certain files within
the storage media or encrypting the medium itself. It can also manipulate the evidence on
the fly especially when the investigator gathers evidence from the physical memory to later
investigate the memory dump in the lab (Harris, 2006).
The manipulation of evidence during a digital forensic phase would result in reaching a
wrong conclusion about a given hypothesis in the analysis phase. This results in gathering
incomplete evidence;thereby, leaving the investigator to work without any vital evidence.
During live forensic investigations, this circumstance may occur if an investigator does not
take proper precautions during the acquisition process.
1.3 Motivation
In 2009, two security researchers developed an anti-forensic tool known as DECAF (Detect
and Eliminate Computer-Assisted Forensics) to detect the live forensic tool COFEE (Com-
puter Online Forensic Evidence Extractor) which is distributed among the law enforcement
community. DECAF is an anti-forensic tool that had claimed to detect forensic tools such as
COFFEE, FTK Imager, EnCase, and perform anti-forensic (AF) operations on the machine.
Later in 2009, the authors of DECAF made an official statement that the AF tool is an hoax,
and was a publicity stunt to raise awareness in the forensic community regarding the security
issues in the DF domain (Mansfield-Devine, 2010).
The existence of this anti-forensic tool could possibly pose a threat to live forensic investiga-
tions. However, if the nature of the tool could be studied, then risks to the DF investigation
process can be minimized. To the best of my knowledge, it appears DECAF tool is not avail-
able on the internet, so it was not possible to conduct experiments to test memory forensic
acquisition tools against it. Also, another aspect of DECAF that has guided this research work
was the method by which DECAF detects forensic acquisition tools. It detected live forensic
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tools by their file signature that included name of the forensic tools (Lim et al., 2012). After
implementing a proof-of-concept of DECAF signature based method in section 2.4, it appears
DECAF executes in user-mode. From 2.3, it is evident that various anti-forensic attacks
mostly work in the kernel of Windows-32 bit machines. Implementing those procedures on
64-bit Windows 10 machines would cause a blue screen of death (BSOD). Therefore, in
this research a method was proposed to detect forensic memory acquisition using artificial
intelligence techniques on 64-bit Windows 10 machines in user-mode.
1.4 Knowledge Gap and Problem
This thesis reports an investigation on anti-forensic techniques affecting various phases in
the digital forensic process, specifically focusing on the acquisition phase. In section 2.5, the
research identifies that artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are being applied to assist the
digital investigation process, for example, to detect malware present in a memory forensic
image. However, the findings in the literature show that artificial intelligence is not being
applied to the anti-forensic domain. To this extent, the aim of this study is:
Aim 1: To accuractely detect memory acquisition on Windows 10 machine using artificial
intelligence techniques
To meet Aim 1 and address the aforemention knowledge gap, the first central research
question (RQ) was posed:
RQ1: How can forensic memory acquisition be accurately detected by artificial intelligence
techniques? In this research, memory is acquired directly from the computer using a USB
device. Memory is not acquired remotely over a network. The corresponding research
objectives for RQ1 are:
1. Differentiate between forensic memory acquisition and non-acquisition using machine
learning classifiers and evaluate their accuracy, precision, and recall metric as it can
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help identifying which machine learning classifier performs well in distinguishing
between memory acquisition and non-acquisition.
2. Cross-validate the results (evaluation metrics) of the machine learning classifiers
with learning curves and bias-variance trade-off. The reason for employing various
strategies to verify the results is to enhance and increase the confidence in the findings,
(Henry, 2018). It also helps in determining the reason why a model does not perform
well. For example, a learning curve shows whether a classifier fits the data well or not,
and this may be due to lower precision or recall which in turn could affect the model’s
accuracy.
3. Encode the samples in the dataset into images and classify them using convolution
neural network (CNN). A CNN will be used as it is well known for classifying images
(Tsai et al., 2019). And, determine model’s performance by comparing accuracy,
precision, recall, false positives, and false negatives.
The findings in sections 2.1 and 2.3 shows that the major phases of the digital forensic (DF)
process such as acquisition, examination, analysis, and reporting are affected by anti-forensic
techniques. To address this problem, the following aim and the second research question was
posed:
Aim 2: To validate digital forensic models in the presence of anti-forensic attacks
RQ2: How can digital forensic models be validated when they are affected by anti-forensic
techniques?
To answer the RQ2 and meet Aim 2, the corresponding research objective is:
Formalize a generic framework to validate digital forensic models by counteracting anti-
forensic techniques.
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1.5 Contribution to Knowledge
The contribution of this thesis fills a knowledge gap and addresses a problem in the field of
anti-forensics.This research proposes a method by which memory forensic acquisition can
be detected. This is facilitated by designing an experiment to gather memory, I/O, and CPU
(MIOC) parameters and then detecting memory forensic acquisition and non-acquisition
activity with the help of various machine learning (ML classifiers that are evaluated in chapter
4.
The second contribution is transforming the MIOC dataset into images by using the Gramian
Summation Field (GSF) property of the Gramian Angular Field (GAF) (Tsai et al., 2019).
The memory acquisition and non-acquisition distinct native attribute (DNA) patterns were
then detected using 3-Layered Convolutional Neural Network (3-L CNN) model which is
evaluated in chapter 5.
The significance of these contributions are that it shows the acquisition phase of the live
forensic process is vulnerable to the DNA pattern detection technique that was proposed
in this research. The Association of Police Officers (ACPO)-Good Practice Guidelines for
Digital Forensics (Williams, 2012) is an important reference document when conducting
digital forensic investigations and is referred by the law enforcement agencies in the United
Kingdom (UK). In Williams (2012, Pg. 26), the steps required to perform live forensics is
documented, and if an investigator performs those steps to acquire memory, then memory
acquisition can be detected using the methods proposed in this research work. Also, the
machine learning algorithms and the 3L-CNN model were implemented in Python. If this
memory detection software is executed on a windows 64-bit machine, it runs in the user-mode
just like any other process on the machine and it will not show any suspicious behaviour
unlike malware processes to the forensic investigator. In an event, even if the investigator tries
to analyse this particular memory detection executable they would have to apply malware
analysis techniques. This will either obfuscate the investigation process or will trick the
1.6 Organisation of Thesis 7
investigator into reaching wrong conclusions, because analysing the MIOC-DNA pattern
detection (or fingerprint) method proposed in this study has not been researched by malware
researchers to date. Therefore, the state-of-art malware analysis techniques (Or-Meir et al.,
2019) will fail to analyse the memory detection procedure proposed in this research.
Another contribution this study makes is that of a novel mathematical formalism to validate
digital forensic models (DFMs) if its under the influence of an anti-forensic attack. The
significance of this contribution is that an investigator would be able to validate their DFM if
an anti-forensic techniques is affecting a particular phase in their digital forensic model. By
doing so, they also will address the issue of validating their forensic tools for anti-forensic
techniques as this is on a lower level when compared to DFM as seen in chapter 6. Therefore,
the novel principle proposed in this research to validate digital forensic models would be
serve as a guide for investigators to validate their process and tools in order to comply with
the ISO 17025 standard in the UK that validates forensic tools (Marshall and Paige, 2018).
1.6 Organisation of Thesis
Chapter 2 reviews various digital forensic models, anti-forensic techniques to ascertain what
phases of the digital forensic process is affected by anti-forensic techniques. It also reviews
various ML algorithms applied to the digital forensic and cybersecurity domain.
Chapter 3 discusses the research methods and proposes the research method for this study. It
also justifies the purpose of designing the experiments, the collecting and pre-processing the
data, and various data analysis techniques.
Chapter 4 evaluates and compares various machine learning classifiers on the MIOC dataset.
The ML classifiers were evaluated based on their confusion matrix parameters which are
accuracy, precision, and recall. These results were cross compared with receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curve, Precision and Recall (P-R)curve, and learning curve to determine
if any model exhibited high bias or variance, that is, whether the model has overfit, underfit,
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or had fit the data well.
Chapter 5 to further support the results of chapter 4, another method to detect forensic
memory acquisition is proposed in this chapter. MIOC parameters are transformed to images
by using the Gramian Summation Field (GSF) property of the Gramian Angular Field (GAF),
and then the DNA patterns are identified by the 3 Layer-Convolutional Neural Network to
differentiate between memory acquisition and non-acquisition.
Chapter 6 proposes a novel mathematical formalism to validate digital forensic models by
counteracting anti-forensic techniques. A paper was submitted in the well renowned journal
publication in digital forensics – Forensic Science International: Digital Forensics.
Chapter 7 discusses how the research questions were answered and the objectives met. It also




The purpose of this chapter is to critically review digital forensic models, anti-forensic
techniques, and applications of AI to digital forensics. Firstly, the digital forensic models
are reviewed to see whether anti-forensic techniques influence a phase in the digital forensic
process. This guided the research to ascertain what phases in the forensic process are affected
by anti-forensic techniques and what procedures can be implemented to counteract those
affects. Secondly, various acquisition tools are reviewed in section 2.3 to find out if there are
any tools resistant or vulnerable to anti-forensic attacks. This is necessary because it gives an
insight into what measures the forensic tools adopt to address anti-forensic attacks, or it can
show the shortcoming or weakness in the forensic tools when it comes to countermeasuring
anti-forensic methods.
Thirdly, applications of AI to digital forensics and anti-forensics are reviewed to find how
AI techniques aid digital investigation, and what AI techniques work against it. Although,
application of AI to anti-forensics is still in its infancy, this area is reviewed to explore if
there are any AI techniques in the literature that has a negative impact on the digital forensic
process. Fourthly, a signature based detection method is implemented as a proof-of concept
to demonstrate how a forensic tool can be detected due to the underlying weakness in the
ACPO guidelines, Williams (2012, Pg. 26), identified in this research, and the shortcoming of
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the method is ascertained. Finally, the knowledge gap and the research problem is identified
and research questions are posed to fill the gap and address the problem.
2.1 Review of Digital Forensic Models
The generic computer forensic investigative model (GCFIM) developed by (Yusoff et al.,
2011) groups common computer forensic phases from previous DFMs. It consists of five
phases: pre-process, acquisition, analysis, presentation, and post-process. GCFIM model can
serve as a high-level computer forensic investigation model and also could assist in creating
new computer forensic investigative methodologies. Similarly, by comparing and expanding
over previous computer forensic models, the Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model
(SRDFIM) was proposed by (Agarwal et al., 2011), which consists of eleven phases namely
preparation, securing the scene, survey and recognition, documenting the scene, communi-
cation shielding, evidence collection, preservation, examination, analysis, presentation and,
result and review. This model helps in reconstructing events by realizing certain properties
such as individuality, repeatability, reliability, performance, testability, scalability, quality and
standards in analysis pertaining to computer frauds and cyber crimes. Whereas, (Soltani and
Seno, 2019) design their event reconstruction model using formal methods such as temporal
logic which is an automatic verification technique, and is evaluated on the file allocation table
(FAT) file system. Eleven digital forensic models were assessed and evaluated by (Montasari,
2016) using the five criteria that is set in the Daubert Standard, a standard that is used to
accept scientific evidence in the United States. None of the eleven models could satisfy all
the conditions of the Daubert Standard as argued by (Meyers and Rogers, 2005). It was
deduced that, (Ciardhuáin et al., 2009) and (Rogers et al., 2006) took the most scientific
approach to develop their digital forensic models. Argument is also made that the DFMs did
not include the full scope of the investigation, and only concentrate on a few aspects of the
digital forensic investigation. The DFMs were based on personal experience and no model
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can be considered as a standard one, and the error rate could not be calculated. The existing
models are not flexible, that is, they are not generalised and cannot be applied to different
domains of digital forensics (Montasari, 2016).
During the last decade specific DFMs developed by (Hitchcock et al., 2016), (Kaur et al.,
2018), (Ali et al., 2017), (Zia et al., 2017), and (Lutui, 2016) focus on certain areas of digital
forensics such as digital triage, network forensics, mobile forensics, and Internet of Things
(IoT) forensics respectively. To increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IoT investigations
(Oriwoh et al., 2013) propose 1-2-3 Zones in conjunction with Next-Best-Thing Triage (NBT)
model where necessary by maximising the utilisation of time to ensure relevant evidence is
identified and acquired. The NBT model and 1-2-3 zones were adopted by (Harbawi and
Varol, 2017) into their digital forensic procedure flowchart and argue that their theoretical
framework for IoT investigations is improved and copes with evidence acquisition issues, and
to analyse potential digital evidence in an IoT ecosystem, (Kebande et al., 2018) proposes an
integrated digital forensic framework for IOT devices.
Various researchers also adopted International Standard Organization (ISO) standards
into their digital forensic framework to either enhance or hope to standardise their framework.
To improve speed and quality of investigations (Kao and Wu, 2016) propose a digital
triage forensics framework of windows malware forensic toolkit based on ISO/IEC 27037,
which provides guidelines with respect to common scenarios encountered during the digital
evidence handling process and assists organisations in their methods and procedures, and
also facilitates the exchange of digital evidence between various jurisdictions. A forensic-by-
design framework to enhance the framework for digital forensic investigations pertaining
to cyber-physical cloud system that aids organisations to recover from a cyber-physical
attack based on ISO 27043:2015 was developed by (Ab Rahman et al., 2016) and this
provides guidelines on various investigation scenarios involving digital evidence. Similarly,
Kigwana et al. (2017) propose a digital forensic investigative framework which is also based
12 Literature Review
on ISO/IEC 27043:2015 to develop a standard eGov forensic investigation procedure, and
Karie et al. (2019) argue that key factors such as blockchain should be added to ISO/IEC
27043:2015 to support standardised digital forensic report generation process.
Only two frameworks, (Rekhis and Boudriga, 2012a) and (Rani and Kumari, 2017), were
found in the literature that consider to detect anti-forensic attacks. A digital forensic process
consisting of five phases was proposed by (Rekhis and Boudriga, 2012a) that takes detection
of anti-forensic attacks into consideration. However, their framework can detect anti-forensic
attacks only in the analysis phase of the digital forensic process. Their framework is
supported by several complex propositions to develop hierarchical visibility theory to detect
anti-forensic attacks as proposed in (Rekhis and Boudriga, 2012b). A case study is also
provided explaining how their propositions are applicable to a case where an administrative
account has been compromised.
Another framework that proposes to detect anti-forensics attack in a cloud environment is
proposed by (Rani and Kumari, 2017). Their framework is based on (Rekhis and Boudriga,
2012a) framework to detect anti-forensic attacks. It consists of six phases, and the authors
only mention to use attack graphs in order to detect the AF attacks, but do not explicitly show
how graph theory or attack graphs can be used to detect AF attacks in a cloud investigative
environment. In their framework also, the anti-forensic attacks are proposed to be detected
in the analysis phase, but by reviewing the literature, the research has identified that anti-
forensic attacks can affect not only the analysis phase but also various important phases in a
digital forensic framework such as collection, examination, and reporting as shown in Table
6.1.
The review of the digital forensic models informs this study that various versions of digital
forensic models are being proposed in the literature by adding or deleting certain phases
in the previous models. And, anti-forensic affects have not been taken into account whilst
developing or enhancing digital forensic models. As the objective of this research is to
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investigate what phases of the digital forensic process is vulnerable to anti-forensic attacks,
specifically, the aquisition phase of the live forensic process. The following section reviews
various acquistion tools to ascertain their vulnerability or resistance to anti-forensic attacks.
2.2 Vulnerabilities in Memory Acquisition Tools
Volatile memory evidence is critical to a digital investigation, and is highly recommended
to be included in the digital investigation process that is used to analyse a crime scene. In
response to the increase in volume of evidence, encryption and with the main focus being on
the survey phase of the digital investigation process, Volatools, was developed (Walters and
Petroni, 2007). Another way to tackle live forensic issues is by a 2-take approach proposed by
(Law et al., 2009) for acquiring physical memory images. In this approach, two consecutive
snapshots of the memory are taken, and this is done to ascertain the confidence level is higher
with respect to presenting the evidence in the court of law. By this methodology the integrity
of the memory images can be verified by comparing their preserved memory area for any
changes in the data that might have taken place. Various memory acquisition tools were
compared with each other with regards to how much space they occupied in the memory,
and how much percentage change each tool induces whilst acquiring the evidence from the
physical memory. This in turn was compared to the methodology of taking a single memory
snapshot by (Law et al., 2009), and they argue that this procedure, of single-snapshot memory
acquisition, is unreliable and unauthentic because it could be challenged in the court of law
with regards to integrity of evidence not being verified.
By comparing various volatile memory acquisition tools with respect to their impact on
memory in terms of memory footprint their potential impact on the machine under examina-
tion can be analysed. Also, tools used to obtain relevant data from memory can be tested
to ascertain the impact on the file system, Registry and DLL usage. This criteria used for
assessing the volatile memory tools should provide a guide for digital forensic examiners
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whilst investigating Windows OS based computers (McDown et al., 2016). Whereas, the
system image and volatile memory data to ascertain the exact state of the computer system in
question, and the sequence of events that led to its attack is a challenging task in live forensics.
In addition to the advantages of the static analysis methodology has, it also consists of data
that is present in the volatile memory such as process hidden in the memory, for example,
a visible rootkit. Also, virtual environment facilitates the process of booting the image for
interactive investigation purposes, and the advantage of this method is that the original image
is, preserved and in pristine condition, and the analysis is repeatable. The evidence gathered
during this process would be admissible in the court of law (Mrdovic et al., 2009).
To address integrity issues in live forensics (Vömel and Freiling, 2012) have defined cor-
rectness, atomicity, and integrity as the three factors for evaluating the quality of a forensic
memory snapshot. The actual values of addressable memory regions are contained in a
correct snapshot at a specific point of time that were stored in those regions. Whereas, an
atomic snapshot does not include any signs of concurrent system activity. The stable values
of memory regions can be estimated by the level of integrity that remain in the course of the
imaging operation. It can specifically measure the impact of certain acquisition methodolo-
gies and differenciate against more invasive software based methods that loads modules into
the memory (kernel); therefore, destroying important pieces of evidence.
Also, various unique factors like correctness, atomicity, and integrity of the acquired memory
can be measured that establishes the quality of memory images to provide a platform to
evaluate open-source memory forensic acquisition software tools such as win32dd (Suiche,
2013), WinPMEM which is now a part of Rekall (Rek, 2019), and ManTech Memory DD
(MDD)(Man, 2015) can be done by using a white-box testing methodology. The memory
sizes can range from 512 MB to 20 GB, and 270 snapshots from different systems were
analysed in an idle state. It was revealed that a few software tools were not able to acquire an
image of the complete physical address space, and also these incomplete memory images
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produced mismatched data offsets. The analysis of these memory images might lead to false
conclusions at a later stage in the investigations, in order to overcome this fault different
utilities were patched. An interesting observation made here was that the atomicity decreased
as the memory sizes increased, and based on this observation it was argued that larger the
memory size longer the acquisition process, and it would be difficult to keep the memory
images free from inconsistencies due to concurrent activity. Whereas, it was observed that
the integrity of the memory images increased with system that had a constant load because
less areas of memory were subject to change proportionally (Vömel and Stüttgen, 2013).
Whereas, (Gruhn and Freiling, 2016) present a black box methodology to evaluate atomicity
and integrity of memory acquisition methods with respect to the correctness of a memory
acquisition procedure, and focus on the soundness of memory acquisition tools and methods.
Several memory acquisition methods were characterised and twelve memory acquisition tools
were evaluated upon a windows 8 64-bit operating system. It was found that, the user-mode
acquisition software such as ProcDump and Windows Task Manager, memimage, msram-
dump, virtualisation using virtualbox, and emulation using QEMU provide perfect atomicity
and integrity of complete RAM snapshot. Whereas, Kernel level memory acquisition tools
such as FTK Imager, DumpIt, win64dd, and WinPmem show concurrent system activity
which reduces its atomicity, and integrity is reduced because the acquisition tools might
overwrite some part of the memory space. DMA attack using inception IEEE 1394 showed
the least atomicity, but its integrity is inferior when compared to any of the aforementioned
methods.
Six windows memory acquisition tools such as Moonsols DumpIt, AccessData FTK
Imager 2016, Winpmem, Belkasoft RAM Capture, Mandiant’s Memoryze (2016), and
Magnet RAM Capture, were comapred on a Windows 32-bit Ultimate machine (Ahmed and
Aslam, 2015). These six memory acquisition tools were compared with each other using
three memory analysis tools namely: Volatility Framework 2.4, Windows SCOPE Ultimate,
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and Mandiant’s Redline. The data sets used for these comparisons were Processes, Driver
Modules, Device Tree, SSDT, IDT, Drivers, Registry Keys, and Network Sockets. Two
scenarios, Scenario I and Scenario II, were framed basing on which the physical memory
was acquired. The former consisted of no anti-debugging tool, and the latter consisted of an
anti-debugging tool named nProtect GameGuard. The results showed that all the six memory
acquisition tools performed normally, and the data was accurately captured from the RAM
and was analysable using the three memory analysis tools. Whereas in the second scenario it
was deduced that, FTK Imager and Magnet RAM capture, could not accurately acquire the
physical memory because they could not be analysed by the three memory acquisition tools.
Various firmware rootkits such as Basic Input Output Sysytem (BIOS) rookits, Extensible
Firmware Interface (EFI) rootkits, Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI)
rootkits leave traces in the physical memory. Firmware rootkits are very dangerous because
they can subvert the base of the machine, and the associated memory traces are highly likely to
be overlooked during an investigation. It can be shown that the software memory acquisition
tools such as memoryze, FTK Imager , Moonsols DumpIt, Windows Memory Reader, LiMe,
WinPmem, and Pmem fail to acquire all parts of the physical memory, especially those
parts of the memory address spaces that contain the firmware data. This drawback has
been eliminated by inventing the memory acquisition tools, WinPmem and Pmem. Thus,
facilitating the memory analysis of the firmware rookits that leave their traces in the physical
memory, (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013). An in-depth analysis of memory forensic acquisition
tools was presented by (McDown et al., 2016). An observation was made regarding Windows
Memory Reader and Belkasoft’s Live Ram Capturer–these tools left the least footprints when
loaded in memory. Whereas, ProDiscoverer and FTK Imager perform poor in memory usage,
processing time, DLL usage, and unwanted artefacts were introduced into the system. It
was also found that Belkasoft’s Live Ram Capturer is the fastest to obtain an image of the
memory, and ProDiscoverer is the slowest to image memory.
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2.3 Anti-Forensic Techniques
A kernel rootkit, DDefy.sys which was implemented by (Bilby, 2006), a disk filter driver to
hide a file from the NTFS filesystem by faking its Directory Entry (Index), Master File Table
(MFT) Entry MFT Data, and data in clusters for larger files. This is done by determining the
drive info and NTFS characteristics for a partition, then locating filename, directory entry
position on disk, clusters containing file data and their position on disk, then the data is hidden.
Ddefy also intercepts the memory by performing a SSDT hook on NtMapViewofSection
for all accesses to physical memory to modify the process and thread list. When a forensic
tool wants to read the physical memory it does so by first acquiring the view of the memory
in the virtual memory. Ddefy creates its own copy of file view thus making it appear as
though the evidence has been gathered properly. This kind of modification would defeat
memory analysis. A python script to demonstrate kernel mode AF techniques was written
by (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013) in which kernel debugger block hiding, hooking memory
enumeration APIs (Application Peripheral Interfaces), and hooking memory mapping APIs
were implemented. They evaluated these techniques against various memory forensic tools,
and found that all of the tools were vulnerable to the aforementioned AF attacks which are
discussed below.
An anti-forensic technique known as One Byte Modification also known as kernel debugger
block hiding was implemented by (Haruyama and Suzuki, 2012). They scanned kernel
objects by traversing through linked lists, for example, in the volatility framework this is
done by searching for debug data header64 structure to find PsActiveProcessHead in kdd
debug data64, and its address will contain the string “KDBG”.The authors then loaded a
kernel driver into x86 XP virtual machine to modify that string value to demonstrate that
memory analysis is vulnerable to that attack. A few of the forensic tools are dependant
on KDBG to resolve symbols, and the aforementioned vulnerability effects the memory
acquisition process can be demonstrated (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013). It is not clear as to how
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the kernel debugger block is hidden to disrupt the acquisition process as this attack does not
hide any objects, rather it modifies the data in the kernel structures which defeats memory
analyses. This has been demonstrated by installing the malicious driver and then acquiring
the image successfully without any disruption to the memory acquisition process (Haruyama
and Suzuki, 2012).
In hooking memory enumeration API the function MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges() prints
out the non-contiguous memory as the kernel sees it by omitting the device memory ranges.
Memory acquisition tools use this function to determine whether it is safe to read certain
memory locations or if it not safe to read in which case it will be a DMA (Direct Memory
Access) mapped memory region. If this function is patched to return a null value, which
indicates that this function has failed, the acquisition fails. Also, an attacker can hook this
function to return certain memory ranges and hide certain memory ranges thereby defeating
the memory acquisition process because to an investigator it will appear as though they
have gathered the complete evidence without being aware that their acquisition process was
incomplete and vulnerable by hooking MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges() API. Whereas,
in hooking memory mapping, the APIs ZwMapViewOfSection(), MmMapIOSpace(), and
MmMapMemoryDumpMdl() are used to map the physical address space to the kernel’s
virtual memory in order to access physical address space. If the first two APIs are patched it
might cause system instability because it is often used by memory driver tools, but a rootkit
can hook these two APIs to thwart memory acquisition. The last API can be patched without
cause system instability to prevent memory from being acquired.
(Milković, 2012) defeated windows memory forensics by developing a proof-of-concept
(PoC) tool known as Dementia that hides objects in memory dumps. It was demonstrated that
most of the memory forensic tools are vulnerable to attacks in the user-mode and kernel mode.
The tool works well on Windows XP, Vista, and Windows7. It implements a user-model
injection, and two kernel methods of hiding objects in memory dumps. If an object is to be
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hidden using the kernel mode method, first the NtWriteFile() function is hooked using the
filesystem minifilter. After the hook, the tool will check to see if a file written is a memory
dump or not, and this is done by checking for known patterns that forensic tools exhibit such
as such as specific NtWriteFile() arguments, process, drivers, file object values and flags.
When the memory dump is detected, certain data can be hidden, for example, processes can
be hidden by locating the EPROCESS block for those processes and unlinking them from
various lists such as ActiveProcessLinks, SessionProcessLinks to name a few, and deleting
the EPROCESS block itself. This method is so powerful that even volatility plugins such
as psscan and psxview cannot detect the hidden process. The threads from target process
are hidden by clearing the thread allocation, and deleting thread handles from PspCidTable.
The author of Dementia claims that no application will detect those threads that have been
deleted.
The process handles are hidden by unlinking the handles from the HandleTableList and
deleted the “Obtb” allocation. The object header for a target process are traversed to see if
PointerCount and HandleCount are equal to 1 which means that there any handles or objects
created or opened by the target process, then the handle table entry and the object are deleted.
If the objects are not opened by the target process then PointerCounter and HandleCount are
decremented and the handle table entry is hidden because the target process is related to it
even thought the object is not related to it. Also, the handle to the target process is stored in
the handle table of PspCidTable and csrss.exe. The target handles are found and removed
from the handle table to ensure that every artefact of the process is deleted in various memory
locations. The next step is to hide the memory allocations which are described by Virtual
Address Descriptor (DMA). VADs are stored in a self-balancing binary tree. The root of the
tree is VadRoot and it is stored in EPROCESS. The tree is then traversed and the “VadX”
descriptor is hidden. Then the entire memory region is cleared if the VAD describes the
private memory or the process image. If the VAD describes a shared section of the memory
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then this section is checked to see if it is used by the target process, and if it used then this
region is cleared along with any mapped files such as file objects. Finally, the drivers are
hidden by unlinking them from the PsLoadedModuleList, deleted the “MmLd” descriptor
from the ldr data table entry, and clearing the driver image from the memory.
But there are other ways to detect drivers if they are hidden by this method. By using volatility
one can scan for driver objects or symlinks to learn more information about the hidden drivers.
In the UserMode the attacker can hook WriteFile() and DeviceIOControl() APIs to modify
the memory dump by hiding target process, process threads and connections. This is a bit
harder to implement because one has no knowledge about the kernel addresses, there is no
way to determine virtual address to private address translation, and only single pages of
the dump is available. Therefore, all relevant information has to be determined manually
from the dump. This is done by searching the current buffer for interesting allocations for
the process, threads, and connections, and if target object encountered then the allocation
is deleted. Also, if the object related to a target object (thread or connection) is found then
it is deleted. The next difficult part is unlinking the process and the thread list because one
cannot know where next or previous object is, only their virtual address (kernel) is known,
and if that object was already written to the file there is no way anything could be modified
in that buffer. To overcome this limitation the author, determined the virtual address of
the object using self-referencing struct members in the EPROCESS structure (for example,
ProfileListHead) then the object is cached in a dictionary with virtual address as the key,
and noted the physical offset of that buffer in the dump, and then fixed the next or previous
pointers either in the current buffer, or moved the file pointer to write a new value and restore
the file pointer. The author states that win32dd is not vulnerable to user-mode attacks.
The assumption made by (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013) that memory acquisition process can
be trusted if the forensic tool does not rely on the operating system, is not completely true
as Hidden in I/O Space (HIveS) which is an anti-forensic mechanism that does not depend
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on the operating system to function, and it is capable of evading a large number of software
based forensic tools (Zhang et al., 2018). HIveS is implemented on x86 AMD architecture.
Physical address space is the is the range of memory addresses that is accessible by the x86
processors. The memory layout is configured by the BIOS by setting values in DRAM Base-
Limit register pair. This configurations sets the physical address space which is mapped to
DRAM in the north bridge. Any access (read or write) in this address space will be forwarded
to the DRAM controller. The other set of registers that sets the memory layout are Mode
Specific Registers (MSR) known as Top of Memory (TOM) registers and these registers
are unique to the AMD processor architecture. There are two TOM registers TOP_MEM1
(TOM1) and TOP_MEM2 (TOM2) that set memory ranges in the address space. Any access
within the range of ROM registers will be directed to DRAM controller, if the requests are
out of TOM ranges then it is forwarded to the I/O space. The physical address layout of
AMD architecture.
The purpose of TOM registers are that they help the operating system ascertain which
memory space are backed by DRAM and I/O devices. Unlike the DRAM base-limit register
which cannot be changed when the system is operational, the TOM registers can be changed
to adjust the address layout, but it would not be wise to do so because the address layout was
pre-determined by the BIOS during system initialisation, so the operating system will not
be expecting the layout to be changed whilst the system is running, if one tries to change
the layout using TOM registers it will result in a system instability and eventually the kernel
will crash. However, the AMD architecture has another set of registers that is unique to its
architecture. The Input Output Remap Registers (IORR). These registers have a specific
functionality by which one can tweak the ranges of the physical address layout (even after the
DRAM base-limit register was set during BIOS initialisation) whilst the system is operational
without crashing the kernel. It is this property of IORR that HIveS leverages to accomplish
its tasks.
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When a processor core wants to access the memory it will first initiate a request through
the north bridge. The multiplexer (MUX) in the north bridge decides whether to forward
this request to DRAM controller, in which case, the process can then access the memory,
or it forwards the request to the south bridge meaning that the processor core cannot have
access to the memory. The MUX makes those decisions based on the physical address layout
which was set by the BIOS base-limit register during system initialisation and then by the
operating system by using TOM registers and IORR. The two states in which HIveS operates
are locked and unlocked. When it operates in locked state, the processor, in this case core1
which is being used by the attacker, cannot access the memory since the requests will be
forwarded to the south bridge. In the unlocked state, the malicious core can access the HiVes
memory as the requests will be forwarded to the DRAM controller. The IORR registers
consists of a base register and a mask register. The length of the memory region is stored
in the mask register along with a valid bit which indicates the IORR configuration pair is
active. Whereas the base register stores the starting address of the IORR region, and the two
important flag bits, WrMem and RdMem. When WrMem and RdMem are set to 1, the north
bridge forwards read or write requests for this physical address range to system memory.
When these bits are set to 0, all requests are directed to the south bridge. In the unlocked
state there could be a chance that the non-malicious core could be used by the forensic tool
to access HIveS memory, to counter this issue the authors implement two new techniques
known as Blackbox write and Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) camouflage, so that only
the malicious core accesses the HIveS memory. The HIveS memory cannot be detected by
forensic tools because HIveS operates outside the scope of the operating system, that is, it
does not rely on the operating system to make changes in the memory. Hence making it
harder for software forensic tools to detect its presence in the memory.
From sections 2.2 and 2.3 it is evident that various phases in the digital forensic process are
vulnerable to anti-forensic attacks. This further highlights the problem from the findings of
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2.1, that various phases of the digital forensic process appears to be affected by anti-forensic
attacks, and most of the digital forensic models do not appear to factor in the anti-forensic
techniques that affects the aforementioned digital forensic phases.
As this research work was motivated by the anti-forensic tool DECAF that was mentioned in
1.3, the next section demonstrates a hypothetical method on how it can affect the acquisition
phase of the live forensic process.
2.4 Signature Based Detection
This section demonstrates a proof-of-concept that DECAF adopts to detect a memory forensic
acquistion tool. For the purpose of this research APCO Guidelines (Williams, 2012) will be
used as a guide to test if the live forensic process is vulnerable to AF attacks or not. The
APCO guidelines recommends to use an USB device for the purpose of incident response/live
forensics. In this research, it is argued that the usage of USB devices is not a secure option to
gather evidence from a machine whilst it is switched on. The reason for this is that Windows
is an event-based operating system (Russinovich et al., 2012a). Theoretically, whenever
an USB device is plugged-in, various messages about the state of the USB device, such as
device insertion and removal, is broadcasted to a window (Jacobs and Satran, 2017a). This
message can be intercepted by AF tools and can perform various functions as discussed
in 1.3, and can be practically demonstrated by conducting the following experiment. This
demonstration intents to show the weakness in the live forensic process specifically during
the acquisition phase:
Experiment 1: To detect a USB device when it is inserted to a live machine, and then perform
the task of detecting any DF tool that is being run from the USB device, and when the both
conditions are met, then programmatically shutdown/reboot the machine.
Software Tools: Windows 10 64-bit Virtual Machine using VMware Player 12.
Code-Lite version 10.0.0
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Fig. 2.1 Signature Based Detection of USB device
Method: Firstly, a C language-code was employed (Jacobs and Satran, 2017a) to detect a USB
device the moment it is inserted into the machine. By capturing the broadcast message, in this
case WM_DEVICECHANGE, with the help of a main window, and passing that captured
message to the Windows Procedure Function (WNDPROC), so that a given operation can be
performed. This would first detect the insertion of an USB device as shown in figure 2.1.
Step 2: Detecting the Forensic tool Methodology: After the USB device is inserted into
the machine, the investigator will manually open the forensic tool or run an automated script
to gather evidence in a forensic sound manner. When the forensic tool is run, it loads itself in
the physical memory, and this circumstance can be detected.
First, a process list of the currently executing process are created by taking a snapshot of
the system with the help of CreateToolhelp32Snapshot function. Then, the process list is
traversed using the Process32First and Process32Next to determine if the target process,
in this case a forensic tool, is in the process list. This is demonstrated by implementing a
program Test.exe. It has 4 arguments h, d, p and s as shown in figure 2.2. “Test.exe h” is the
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Fig. 2.2 Program to Detect USB Device
Fig. 2.3 Forensic Tool Detected
help option and shows the user about that usage of other options. To detect the whether a
process is running when an USB is inserted just type in the “Test.exe p” command in the
command prompt. Then, when an investigator inserts the USB device, first the USB device
insertion will be detected, then the program checks whether a forensic tool is running or not.
If the tool is not running then it will display “process does not exist” on the screen, or if the
process exists it displays the name of the process along with its process identifier (pid), as
shown in figure 2.3.
Step 3: Shutting Down the machine
After the insertion of the USB device is detected, and the forensic tool detected, the machine
can be shut down. Now, why would one want to shut down the system? briefly mentions
and describes the shortcomings of the traditional forensic process of pulling the plug off the
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system. To overcome those shortcomings such as anti-forensic tool executes only in memory,
the system cannot be taken down due to business critical operations which could otherwise
lead to legal ramifications if it is shut down. Also, if the investigator decides to image the
hard drive, the integrity of the evidence would be compromised, and later this evidence could
be deemed to be inadmissible in the court of law on the grounds of spoliation of evidence,
because during shutdown the operating system flushes data onto the hard drive, or in worst
cases if the attacker has written a script to wipe the hard drive during shut down then there
would be no evidence to work with. Thereby not only defeating live investigative process,
but also the traditional investigative process. To programmatically shutdown the system, the
ExitWindowsEx function is used. The program must enable the SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME
privilege must be first enabled, and this is done through AdjustTokenPrivileges function
(Jacobs and Satran, 2017b).
The shortcoming of signature based detection is that, if the process name of the forensic
tool is changed, then the method described in this section to detect a forensic tool will fail.
Therefore for that reason, this study intended to explore alternative ways to detect forensic
memory acquisition such as pattern matching and detection, which gave rise to the following
research question (RQ1):
How can forensic memory acquisition be accurately detected by artificial intelligence tech-
niques? (or)
Can machine learning algorithms and deep learning models be able to recognise or detect
forensic memory acquisition patterns?
The objective to the corresponding research question is to find the application of AI to the
domain of digital forensics and anti-forensics. In the next section the application of AI to
those domains are reviewed.
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2.5 Artificial Intelligence in Digital Forensics
Artifical intelligence (AI) is complex to define as it is comprised of numerous definitions
in the literature (Dönmez, 2013, Pg 9). Broadly, the definition of AI can be divided into
two categories. The first category involves observing and hypothising human behaviour,
and the second catergory involves a rationalist approach which is a mixture of mathematics
and engineering (Russell and Norvig, 2010). For the relevance in digital forensics, (Duce
et al., 2010) adopt a pragmatic approach and define AI as, "creating a computer process that
acts in a manner that an ordinary person would deem intelligent". It appears that various
researchers have applied this definition of AI into their framework to design AI applications
for digital forensic purposes. These AI applications mostly utilise concepts from machine
learning (ML) (Stephen, 2014, Pg 6) and deep learning (DL) (Dönmez, 2013, 388), one of
the few branches of AI, to detect and classify malwares, improve intrusion detection systems,
combat cyber crimes to name a few. These various applications of AI will be reviewed in the
following section.
2.5.1 Using AI to Detect Malware
One of the areas where ML is used in digital forensics is malware detection. During the
past few years researches have used various ML algorithms to detect malware. One of the
ways by which malware can be detected is by extracting features from the header of portable
executable 32-bit file on Windows operating system. The experimental results of (Markel
and Bilzor, 2015) show that decision tree classifier perform better by discriminating between
malicious and benign executables over logistic regression and naive bayes algorithms. A
similar approach of extracting features from malicious and benign excutables was carried out
by (Sewak et al., 2018). In their experimental setup features were gathered from executables
by autoencoders and by varying threshold. Later, the features were inputted to random
forest classifier (RFC) and a deep neural network (DNN) with two, four, and seven layers
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respectively. The results show that RFC performs better than any of the DNNs with 99.78
percent accuracy using varying threshold.
Another well known way to detect malware is through memory images. Features can then be
extracted from memory images by using wavelet transforms. Makandar and Patrot (2017)
had adopted such method to extract features. Afterwards, principle component analysis
was applied to the extracted features to select the desired features. Their results show an
accuracy of 98.84 percent using k-neighbours algorithm and 98.88 percent using support
vector machine (SVM) algorithm to classify malwares. Whereas, (Dai et al., 2018) derived
their memory dumps from sandbox whilst a malware is running dynamically on the virtual
machine. Later the memory dumps were converted to grayscale images for feature extraction.
Histogram oriented gradients (HOG) were used to extract features from grayscale images.
Their results show their multi-layer perceptron (MLP) model classifies malware with 95.2
percent accuracy, and with a f1-score of 94.1 percent.
Instead of extracting features from executables or converting memory dumps to images,
(Sihwail et al., 2019) directly extract two types of features from memory dumps. The first
feature is extracted with volatality analyser through which API features are extracted, and
from there memory features vector are created. The second feature is extracted using cuckoo
sandbox and by monitoring the log files, the dynamic features vector are created. These
two features are first classified individually, and then they are integrated to be classified
and compared with five ML algorithms. When classified individually, the results show
that dynamic features perform well over memory features with SVM being the leading ML
algorithm with accuracy of 97.4 percent and false positive rate of 4.9 percent. Now, when both
the features are integrated the overall performance of the classification is increased by using
SVM with accuracy being 98.5 percent and FPR of 1.7 percent. Whilst, the aforementioned
malware detection methods mostly use ML algorithms, (Le et al., 2018) convert their malware
dataset to grayscale images and use convolutional neural network (CNN) and its their two
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improvised version of CNNs, namely CNN Uni Long Short Term Memory (CNN UniLSTM)
and CNN BiLSTM which consists of one and two layers of LSTM respectively just before
the output layer. Their results show that CNN BiLSTM outperforms other models with an
accuracy of 98.2 percent. Similarly, (Vinayakumar et al., 2019) also adopt various DNN
architectures to compare and contrast their results with ML agorithms. After the dataset was
converted to grayscale images, the results show that two layered (CNN2-LSTM) performed
better with 96.3 percent accuracy for dataset 1, and 98.8 percent accuracy for dataset 2 using
10-fold cross validation.
One of the innovative ways to detect malware is to extract feature from malware network
traffic instead of malware executables or binaries. The method of extracting features from
malware traffic was adopted by (Chen et al., 2019). Various features were extracted from
malware traffic, and feature selection techniques such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) and
AutoEncoder were used. To account for data imbalance, the synthetic minority over-sampling
technique (SMOTE) was used. Finally, extreme gradient boost (XGBoost) ML algorithm
was to used to classify malware. The experiments were carried out using XGBoost with
ANOVA, AutoEncoder, ANOVA and SMOTE, and finally AutoEncoder and SMOTE which
has the highest classification accuracy of 99.88 percent when compared to other methods.
Whilst answering RQ2, it was found that AI is being applied to the digital forensics and
cyber security domain as seen in 2.5.1. It does not appear that AI is being applied to the
anti-forensics domain, and this is the knowledge gap this study has identified. To fill this
knowledge gap, RQ2 was answered by adopting the methodology in 3.3, and supporting the
hypothesis in 3.3.2 with the results obtained in chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
2.6 Overview of Machine Learning Algorithms
In this section, the eight supervised machine learning algorithms that have been used in
this research study are briefly discussed. These eight algorithms have been selected as they
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are extensively used in the literature of cyber forensics and security as seen in the previous
section 2.5.1.
2.6.1 Linear Discriminant Analysis
The linear discriminant analysis (LDA) is model that estimates mean and variance from a
dataset for every class. For example, if only one variable is considered with two classes, then






Where mc is the mean of the dataset (x) for the class (c). nc is number of instances with class
(c). The variance is estimated as the average squared difference of (x) from the mean, as






Where, σ2 is the variance across the input feature (x), n is the number of instances, c is
the number of classes, and mc is the mean of the input features (x) for the class to which xi
belongs to. This means the squared difference of each input value from the mean within class
groups is calculated but with the average of the differences across all class groups. LDA
predicts outputs by estimating the probablity that a set of input features belongs to each class,
then the class with the highest probability is outputted. This model uses bayes theorem to
estimate probabilities. The formula used to estimate probability of the output class (c) given
the input feature (x) is expressed in equation 2.3.
P(Y = c|X = x) = P(c)×P(x|c)
ΣCi=1(P(i)×P(x|i))
(2.3)
Where, P(Y=c|X=x) is the probability of the class Y=c, given the input features x.
P(c) is the probability of a class (c).
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P(x|c) is the estimated probability of x belonging to the class (c).
The term in the denominator is accounted for each class (i). It is the probability of the ith
class P(i) and the probability of the input feature given the class (i), that is, P(x|i).
To estimate P(x|i), gaussian distribution function can be used, and during estimation the
probability terms cancel each other, and it results in a discriminate function for class (c)
which is calculated for each class. The class with the greatest discriminant will make the









Dc(x) is the discriminant function for class (c) given input feature x, the mean (mk), variance
(σ2) and P(c). All these terms are estimated from the input features. The ln() function is the
natural logarithm (Jason, 2016, Pg 63).
2.6.2 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is one of the popular and well known machine learning
developed in the 1990s. The working of SVM is best explained by the concept of maximal-
margin classfier. Consider, the input features (x), that is, the data which is the coloumns in the
dataset for an n-dimensional space. For example, if the dataset contains two input features,
then this would form a two-dimensional (2D) space. Now, in order for the classification to
take place, the points in the space must be separate. In the case of 2D space, a line which is
also known as hyperplane, can be used to separate the points in the input feature space by
their class. In 2D space this will be class 0 and class 1. The equation of the hyperplane in 2D
space is represented by equation 2.5
B0+(B1×X1)+(B2×X2) = 0 (2.5)
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The coefficients B1 abd B2 determine the slope of the line, and the intercept B0 is found by
the learning algorithm. X1 and X2 are two input features. Classification can be made by
substituting the input feature values in equation 2.5, and then calculate whether a point is
above or below the line. Whether a point in space belongs to class 1 or class 0 is determined
by the following steps:
1. If the hyperplane equation returns a value greater than zero, then the point lies above
the plane and it belongs to the first class, which is class 0.
2. If the hyperplane equation returns a value less than zero, then the point lies below the
plane and it belongs to the second class, which is class 1.
3. If the hyperplane equation results in a value which is almost zero, then it may not be
possible to classify that point.
4. If the result in equation 2.5 is large, then the model’s prediction may have a higher
confidence.
The distance between the line and closest data point is known as margin. A Maximal-Margin
hyperplane is a line with largest margin that can differentiation between two classes. This
margin is calculated as the perpenducular from the line to the closest point. These points
are relevant in defining the line and the classifier, and are known as support vectors. The
hyperplane is learned from the training dataset by maximizing the margin (Shalev-Shwartz
and Ben-David, 2013).
In real-time scenarios, the data cannot be separated by the hyperplane perfectly. This is due
to restriction placed on the hyperplane to maximize the margin. In order to minimize the
restriction a method known as soft margin classifier (SMC) is adopted. SMC allows certain
points in the training dataset to breach the separating line by introducing coefficients (also
known as slack variables) to give the margin wiggle room in each dimension. Therefore,
increasing the complexity of the model.
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The magnitude of the wiggle is defined by the tuning parameter C across all dimensions.
This means C defines the number of violations the margin is allowed. If C is 0, then there are
no violations, and the classification is done based on the maximal-margin classifier. When
the hyperplane is being learned fromm the training dataset, the training data points that lie
withhin the distance of the margin affects the placements of the hyperplane, which means the
value of C influences the number of support vectors used by the classifier. Larger C values
will result in lower variance and higher bias because it makes the algorithm less sensitive to
the training data. Whereas, smaller C values will result in higher variance and lower bias
because the algorithm becomes highly sensitive to the training data (Xin et al., 2018).
2.6.3 Gaussian Naive Bayes
In Gaussian Naive Bayes (NB), in addition to the probabilities, the mean and standard










Where x are the values for an input featurein the training dataset and n is the number of










Where, n is the instances, xi is the value of the input feature (x) for the ith instance and
m(x) is the mean. Predictions are made based on the Gaussian Probability density function
(pdf). Gaussian pdf gives the probability estimate for a input feature of a class. The equation
of Gaussian pdf is








Where, x is the input data, mean, and SD are explained in equations 2.6 and 2.7 respectively,
π is the numerical constant whose value is 3.14, e is the Euler’s number. Probabilities can
then be substituted in equation 2.8 to make predictions (Jason, 2016, Pg 94).
2.6.4 K-Nearest Neighbours
K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) makes predictions by using the entire dataset. When a new
dataset is received as an input to the algorithm, predictions are made by searching through the
entire training dataset for the K most similar events, that is, the neighbours, and summarising
the output class for those K events. During classification this is the mode (the most common
feature occuring in the dataset) class value. In order to determine the K instances in the
training set that are closely similar to a new input feature in the test dataset, a distance
measure is used. The most popularly used distance measure is Euclidean distance. It is
calculated as square root of thesum of differences squared between two points x1 and x2






(x1 − x2)2 (2.9)
Other distance measures are the Hamming, Manhattan, and Minkowski Distance. In hamming
distance the distance between the binary vectors are calculated. Manhattan distance calculates
the distance between vectors using their absolute difference. The genralisation of Manhattan
and Euclidean distance is Minkowski distance (Xin et al., 2018).
2.6.5 Decision Tree
Decision tree uses one of the most powerful datastructure known as binary tree. Binary
trees not only have low computational cost but also the cost of using it is even lower, that
is, the time taken to implement a decision tree algorithm is lesser. For this reason it is used
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in machine learning as querying a trained algorithm should be quick. A benefit for using
decision tree aclgorithms is that there is transparency to get to the classification answer by
following a tree. This, in turn increases the trust in the algorithm, and is the reason why it has
become popular over recent years (Stephen, 2014, Pg 249). Few of the well known decision
tree algorithms are Iterative Dichotomiser 3 (ID3), C4.5, and Classification and Regression
Tree (CART).
In ID3, the data set (S) is trained to produce a decision tree. This process entails two steps
which are entropy and information gain. Entropy H(S) is a measure of uncertainity in the





• S is the dataset for which entropy will be calculated. The dataset changes at each step
of the algorithm, that is, at each node.
• C is the set of classes in S.
• p(i) is the proportion of the number of items in class i to thee number of items in S.
When, H(S) is zero, the dataset (S) is perfectly classified, that is, all items in S are of the
same class. The entropy is calculated for all attributes. The attribute with smallest entropy is
used to split dataset (S) on an iteration. After entropy, the information gain is calculated. The
information gain G(A) of an attribute "A" is the difference in entropy in dataset (S) and the
dataset (S) given the attribute A.
G(S,A) = H(S)− ∑
f∈F
p( f )H( f ) = H(S)−H(S|A) (2.11)
In equation 2.11,
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• H(S) is the entropy in dataset (S)
• F is the subset created after splitting S by attribute A
• p(f) is the proportion of the items in f to the number of items in S
• H(f) is the entropy of subset f
• H(S|A) is the entropy of S given A
In ID3 information gain is calculated for each attribute. The attribute with highest information
gain is used to split S on the current iteration. In CART, the Gini index or Gini Impurity is
used as the information measure. Here, the impurity means that the decision tree has each
leaf node represent a set of instances that are in the same class in order to avoid mismatches








Where c is the number of classes. i and j are specific classes. Since there has to be an output
class, ∑
j ̸=i






The information measure can be calculated in terms of misclassification rate (Stephen, 2014,
pg 261). This can be done by adding a weight to the misclassification instances. The concept
here is to evaluate the cost of misclassifying a datapoint in class i and class j, and then add a




λi jN(i)N( j) (2.14)
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2.6.6 Random Forest Classifier
Random Forest Classifier (RFC) is an extension to the decision tree classifier. The shortcom-
ing of decision tree classifier is that it suffers with high variance as it overfits the data. In
order to overcome this shortcoming RFC is adopted. RFC makes use of two concepts to
minimize overfitting, which are random sampling of training datapoints during tree-building,
and random subset of features when splitting nodes.
During training, a tree in a random forest learn from the random sample of the dataset. The
samples are drawn with replacement and is known as bootstrapping, and it means some
samples will be used will be used on a tree multiple times. By training trees on different
samples, and if the trees have high variance when compared to a particular set of training
dataset. Overall, the entire forest will have lower variance but not at the cost of increasing
the bias.
The other concept in RFC is that only a subset of features will be considered in each decision
tree for splitting a node. In sklearn RFC library, which is used in this research, this is
controlled by adjusting the parameter sqrt(n_features) for classification. For example, if there
are 9 features, then only 3 features would be selected to split a node. Now, during the testing
phase the predictions from each decision tree is averaged to make the final prediction. The
process of training each individual decision learning algorithm on a subset of data is known
as bootstrap aggregating or bagging (Jason, 2016, Pg 126).
2.6.7 AdaBoost Classifier
AdaBoost is mostly used to boost the performance of decision trees. It is also referred to
discrete AdaBoost when applied to classification problems. It works good with weak learners,
which are models that achieve accuracy greater than random chance for a classification prob-
lem. The reason one-level decision trees, also known as decision stump, are most commonly
used with AdaBoost is because they contain only one decision to make a classification. As
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Where i is the ith training instance, and n is the number of training instances.
Using the weighted samples a weak classifier, that is, a decision stump is formed from the
training dataset. For example, in binary classification situations, a decision stump takes an
input feature and makes one decision, and then outputs +1.0 or −1.0 for class 1 (first class)
and class 0 (second class) respectively. For the trained model, the misclassification rate or





Where, ti are tje training instances that are predicted correctly by the model, N is the total
training instances. To calculate the overall error, equation 2.16 can be modified to use the









Equation 2.17 is the weighted sum of the misclassification rate. Where, wi is the training
instance weight, pεi is the prediction error for ith training instance. In the case of misclassi-
fication pεi is 1 and 0 in the case of correct classification. The next step is to calculate the
stage value which provides weights for the predictions AdaBoost makes. The stage value (α)





Where, α is the stage value used for weighting predictions from the model, ln() is the natural
logarithm, and ε is the misclassification error for the model. Stage weight is more for accurate
models. The training weights are updated during every iteration and this gives more weight
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to incorrectly predicted instances and less weights to instances that have been incorrectly
predicted. The updated training instance weight (w) is calculated as:
w = w× eα×pεi (2.19)
The final step is to make predictions by calculating the weighted average of the weak
classifiers. Given a new input, the predicted values are weighted by each weak learners stage
value. The prediction for the ensemble model is taken as the sum of the weighted predictions.
If the sum is positive, then class 0 is predicted, and if it is negative then the class1 is predicted.






Where, P(x) is the output classifier or prediction, α is the stage value, N is the number of
training instances, and pt(x) is the prediction from the decision stump (Jason, 2016, Pg 137).
2.6.8 Gradient Boosting Classifier
Gradient boosting combines the weak learners sequentially to a strong learner by an iterative
process. The goal here is to teach a model F, to make predictions of the form ŷ = F(x) by
minimizing the means squared error (MSE) 1n ∑i(ŷi − yi)
2, where i iterates over the training
dataset consisting of n samples and the output predictor variable y.
At each iteration m of gradient boosting, it is assumed that the imperfect model Fm, which
initially is a weak model that predicts the mean of the output variable y. On every iteration
the gradient boosting algorithm improves on Fm by sequentially constructing new models
that adds the estimator h to improve the model after each iteration. This improvement is
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mathematically expressed as:
Fm+1(x) = Fm(x)+h(x) = y (2.21)
As gradient boosting will try to fit h to y−Fm(x), Fm+1 attempts to rectify errors of its previous
model Fm. Therefore, the final model Fm will result in higher accuracy with minimum amount
of error (Chen and Guestrin, 2016).
2.7 Conclusion
In section 2.1, various DFMs were reviewed to find out whether anti-forensic affects are
taken into account in their approach or design. The findings show that there are generic and
specific DFMs proposed, and it has been identified that AF affects have not been taken into
consideration in DFMs apart from (Rekhis and Boudriga, 2012a) and (Rani and Kumari,
2017). This further necessitated to review various AF techniques 2.3, to find which AF
techniques affected which phase in the DF process. The aforementioned, in conjunction
with the findings from section 2.2, in which forensic acquisition tools were compared to see
if they were resistant or vulnerable to AF techniques. The findings identified the research
problem, that the four major phases of the DF process acquisition, examination, analysis,
and reporting are affected by AF techniques. To address this research problem, RQ2 was
posed: How can digital forensic models be validated when they are affected by anti-forensic
techniques? and was answered with help of the research objective 6 (RO 6) mentioned in
section 1.4 in chapter 6.
The findings from section 2.5.1 show that one of the most prominent application of AI in
digital forensics is detecting malware, and various methods have been proposed to detect
malware. The most common method being, first transforming a memory image into the
corresponding gray-scale image. After this transformation, majorily ML algorithms were
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applied to classify various malware families. Mostly, the authors presented their results
based on the accuracy of the results, and overlooked the fact accuracy alone is not enough to
analyse a ML model, and various other factors such as precision, recall to name a few must
be taken in account.
AI is mostly applied to assist in digital forensic examinations such as detection of malware
in a memory image as seen in section 2.5. Its application in anti-forensics is scarce. Also,
the anti-forensic techniques in section 2.3 is complex and works only on Windows 32-bit
machines in user-mode, and they would cause a BSOD when implemented on Windows
10 64-bit machines. When coupled with the shortcoming demonstrated in section 2.4, it
highlights the knowledge gap this research has identified. Which is, the application of AI to
the domain of anti-forensics. Specifically, the application of machine learning algorithms
to detect memory acquisition patters during a live forensic acquisition process. To fill, the
aforementioned knowledge gap, the research question (RQ1) was posed: How can forensic
memory acquisition be accurately detected by artificial intelligence techniques? RQ1 was
answered with the help of research objectives (RO1-RO5) mentioned in section 1.4 and
by adopting and justifying the research method discussed in Chapter 3, and proposes two
methods as discussed in chapter 4 and 5 respectively, in which various supervised machine





This chapter outlines the research approach that is taken in AI research in section 3.2 and
compares it with the scientific method. In this research, the research approach gave rise to
the methodology and that in turn had influenced the choice of research method, which is
elaborated in section 3.3. The research problem and the central research question are stated
again to operationalize the hypothesis, and this further guided in designing the experiment.
Data collection and pre-processing is discussed in detail as it is an important step as they
form the inputs to ML classifiers. Various evaluation metrics are presented and explained as
the ML and DL models will be evaluated based on those metrics.
3.2 Research Approach in Artificial Intelligence
In AI, the dominating epistemological stance is the positivist approach (Alauthman, 2016,
Pg 6), where the focus of the study is on facts to determine the causal relationship between
independent variable(s) and dependent variable(s) (Gray, 2014). In AI, the research method-
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ology that emerges from the positivist approach is the experimental research method, and it
consists of the following steps as mentioned by (Cherkassy, Pg 5):
1. State the problem: The problem in AI is application specific which is performed in
a particular domain of AI such as machine learning and deep learning. The domain
specific knowledge and experience is the driving force in figuring out a problem in AI.
Focus here must be on finding and framing an effect problem statement rather than
focusing on the learning algorithm.
2. Formulate the hypothesis: Once the problem has been identified, the next step is
to formulate a hypothesis that can be tested and falsified. The hypothesis should be
formulated in such a way so that the independent and dependent variables are identified.
3. Design the experiment: In this step the data is generated by selecting an experimental
design procedure. In AI experiments, this could be a true experimental procdure or
quasi-experimental procedure. A true experimental procedure is an experiment where
data is generted randomly, whereas in a quasi-experiment the data assignment and
generation is not random. Proper selection of experiment will influence the sampling
size which is crucial for collecting data.
4. Collect and pre-process the data: Once the data is generated, it should be processed in
a format that is desired by the AI algorithm.
5. Estimate the model: When the hypothesis in step 2 was formulated, the variables in
it must be indentified, so that the dependency between the input and output variables
or features can be determined. This is done by qusntifying the dependencies from
available data and the previous knowledge about the problem. The aim here is to
design models for accurate prediction of future outputs from the known input variables.
Predictive accuracy is also known as generalization capability in neural networks.
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6. Interpret the Models: Depending on the problem and hypothesis, the researcher will be
informed as to what metrics must be evaluated so that the model can be interpreted.
Here interpretation is done to determine whether the model has higher accuracy,
precision, recall to name a few.
The steps mentioned in 3.2 by (Cherkassy, Pg 5) is similar to the scientific method, and
consists of the following steps, (Goebel and Plagemann, 2009):
1. Frame questions: The questions are framed from the existing theory and observations.
In a research study, the researcher might be informed by the literature review as to
what questions needs to be framed to address the knowlege gap or the problem that has
been identified.
2. Formulate Hypothesis: Formulating hypothesis is an important step in the scientific
method. A hypothesis is a conjecture because is provides a provisional or a tentative
explanation regarding a certain phenomenon. Again, in a research study the researcher
is informed by the research questions in step 1 to formulate the hypothesis. An
importaint point to note here is, if the hypothesis formulated in this step is a scientific
hypothesis, then it must be falsifiable. It means that there are certain outcomes in an
experiment where the evidence will not support the hypothesis. If a hypothesis cannot
be falsified, then it will not satisfy the criteria of scientific hypothesis, (Jeong and
Kwon, 2006).
3. Make Predictions: After formulating the hypothesis, predictions are made as a con-
sequence of logical deductions. The purpose of prediction is to compare the results
of the experiments to that of the predictions. Whilst making predictions the answer
should not be known, or else it will weaken the evidence.
4. Test the hypothesis: The hypothesis is tested by conducting experiments. The purpose
of the experiment is to determine whether the results of the experiment agree or
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disagree with the predictions. Agreement increases the confidence or supports the
hypothesis. It does not mean that the hypothesis is true. Experiments must be designed
to minimize the effects of variables other than the independent variable, (Gray, 2014).
Steps 2-3-4 must be looped until the agreement between the results and predictions are
reached. If major discrepancies are found, the researcher must go back to step 1.
5. The hypothesis becomes a theory when it has obtained consistency by withstanding
rigourous attempts to falsify it. This will give rise to a set of propositions that define a
new phenomena or a theoretical concept.
3.3 Proposed Research Methodology
As seen in section 3.2, the AI research method and scientific method are similar, and steps
2, 3, and 4 are iterative in the latter method. In this research, the research methodology is
informed by the epistemology of positivism, and is influenced by the methods discussed in
section 3.2. Therefore, the research methodology adopted in this research is the experimental
research method which consists of the following steps:
1. Identify the research problem and pose question(s)
2. Formulate the hypothesis and make predictions
3. Design the Experiment
4. Gather and pre-process the data
5. Evaluate and Interpret the model
6. Accept, modify, or reject the hypothesis
The first step will be to identify the research problem and then to address the problem various
research questions were posed from which a hypothesis was formulated as a tentative answer
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that was tested by conducting an experiment. Just before conducting the experiment, the
sample size was determined in a way that reduces type I and II erros. Then an experiment
was designed to gather and pre-process the data. Various evaluation metrics are presented in
section 3.3.6. The hypothesis was then modified, accepted and falsified based on the results
presented in chapters 4 and 5. The sections that follow describe each step of the proposed
research method in detail.
3.3.1 Problem statement and Research Questions
The research problem was identified in section 2.7 and to address that problem a research
question was posed. To answer the central research question 1 (RQ1), "How can forensic
memory acquisition be accurately detected by artificial intelligence techniques?", from the
findings of the literature review, it was found that AI is being applied to the AF domain.
Therefore to meet the objective (RO1-RO5), the research focuses on detecting the live
forensic acquisition patterns on windows 10, 64-bit machines using supervised machine
learning algorithms.
This research proposes the following method to capture memory acquisition patterns. Since
a process is a software program that executes in the physical memory. Every process
on a Windows machine has certain CPU parameters Rodola (2019) and, memory and
I/O parameters associated with it as described in (Russinovich et al., 2012b, Pg187), and
(Russinovich et al., 2012b, Pg 8) respectively. The forensic memory acquisition tools such
as AccessData FTK Imager (FTK, 2019), Magnet RAM Capture (MAG, 2019), Belkasoft
RAM Capturer (Bel, 2019) to name a few are also processes when they are executed on the
machine to acquire memory. Since these memory forensic acquisition tools will have their
own memory, I/O, and CPU (MIOC) parameters associated with them. Therefore, to address
the problem mention in section 1.4 and answer RQ1, the following research hypothesis was
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formulated in sub-section 3.3.2 as a tentative answer that was tested using the experimental
research method described in sub-section 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Hypothesis
The hypothesis is stated as follows: It may be possible to detect forensic memory acquisition
on a windows 64-bit machine by detecting the variability pattern of their respective MIOC
parameters whilst memory is being acquired by a forensic tool.
In the hypothesis, it was assumed that this variability pattern in MIOC parameters is due
to memory acquisition. Another assumption is that this variability pattern is distinct and
native to memory acquisition and non-acquisition, and hence variability pattern of MIOC
parameters is termed as as Distinctive Native Attribute (DNA) patterns, which is defined
as: The distinct MIOC patterns native to a memory forensic acquisition tool. It is distinct
because it is different for memory acquisition and non-acquisition and native in the sense
that each forensic tool has its unique associated MIOC parameter variation when executed in
memory.
3.3.3 Prediction
From the hypothesis formulated in section 3.3.2, the argument this study makes is that there is
a causal relationship that exists between memory acquisition and MIOC parameters, because
memory acquisition induces DNA patterns in MIOC parameters, and it is these DNA patterns
in MIOC parameters that can differentiate between memory acquisition and non-acquisition.
Therefore, if memory acquisition is the cause for variability in MIOC parameters, then by
the concept of inverse function MASH (2005) MIOC parameters can be mapped back to
memory acquisition and is explained in Prediction 3.1.
Prediction 3.1: If memory acquisition (Ma) is a function (f) of MIOC parameters, which is
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mathematically expressed in equation 3.1 and diagramatically in figure 3.1 :
f (Ma) = MIOC (3.1)
Fig. 3.1 MIOC Parameters as a function of Memory Acquisition
And, if there exists an inverse function such that,
f−1(MIOC) = Ma (3.2)
then memory acquisition is said to be detected, which in turn means memory acquisition
causes DNA pattern effect in MIOC parameters. In other words, when MIOC parameters
form the inputs to a ML classifier as shown in figure 3.2, and if the inverse function ( f−1)
can differenciate between memory acquisition and non-acquisition by conforming to the
threshold criteria in section 3.3.7, then memory acquistion can be detected.
Fig. 3.2 Inverse Function of MIOC
But during detection, there exists an error (e) which threatens the accuracy of the outcomes
(Jason, 2016). Lower the value of e, higher the confidence in the evidence that supports the
hypothesis. Greater the value of e, then the hypothesis may be modified or rejected. The
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error (e) is described in detail in section 3.3.6. Therefore, equation 3.2 can be re-written as,
f−1(MIOC) = Ma + e (3.3)
To further support the hypothesis, DNA patterns from MIOC parameters are extracted by the
method described in section 5.2.1. These patterns are then classified into memory acquisition
and non-acquisition using 3L-CNN described in section 5.4.
3.3.4 Experimental Design
From the hypothesis, it is clear that this research concerns with the causal relationship
between memory acquisition (independent variable) and MIOC parameters (dependent
variables). Therefore, to determine the existence of causal relationship between memory
acquisition and MIOC parameters, two groups are made. The first group is the control group
in which memory was not acquired, and the second group is the experimental group in which
the memory was acquired. The MIOC parameters was gathered from ten windows 10 64-bit
machines. Before collecting these parameters from the machines, it is essential to determine
and justify the sample size, which is discussed in the following section.
Sample Size Justification
The minimum sample size is determined by performing power analysis. Power analysis
comprises of four important paramters effect size, significance level, statistical power, and
sample size (Becker, 2011, Pg 56). In statistical hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis (H0)
predicts the outcome of an experiment. For example, the null hypothesis for a student t-test is
there is no significance difference between the means of two groups. This test is interpreted
using the significance level (α) also known as the p-value. The p-value is the probability of
observing the outcome given that the null hypothesis is true. Usually, the significance level is
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set to 0.05 or 5 percent in most experiments. Given the significance level, two types of errors
can occur whilst interpreting the results (Becker, 2011, Pg 50-52):
Type I error: It is also known as false positive(FP), and it occurs when the null hypothesis is
rejected and there is no significant effect.
Type II error: It is also known as false negative (FN), and it occurs when the null hypothesis
is not rejected and there is significant effect.
To determine if the probability of a test correctly rejects null hypothesis then statistical power
test needs to be conducted. Statistical power is a probability that a test will correctly reject
null hypothesis and it has relevance only when the null hypothesis is false, (Becker, 2011, Pg
60). If the statistical power for a given experiment is higher, then lower the probability of
making a Type II error. In this research, it means the probability of detecting the DNA pattern
effect is higher. Experimental results with low statistical power will lead to conclusions that
are invalid. Therefore, a minimum level of statistical power must be taken into consideration
when designing experiments. Whilst designing experiments, it is common to have a statistical
power of 80 percent or greater. This means a 20 percent chance of making a Type II error.
This is different to the 5 percent chance of making a Type I error for the standard value for
the significance level, that is, 0.05 (Becker, 2011, Pg 52-54). Therefore, given the effect size,
statistical power, and significance level, the sample size can be determined. In this research,
to conform to the hypothesis in section 3.3.2, the values of effect size, significance level, and
statistical power were chosen to be 0.99, 0.01, and 0.99. This means, to estimate a sample
size in order to at least detect DNA pattern effect of 0.99, with an 99 percent chance of
detecting DNA pattern effect if it is true, that is, 1 percent chance of making Type II error and
1 percent chance of detecting DNA pattern effect if there is no such effect, that is, making
Type I error.
The sample size was calculated using the statsmodels TTestIndPower library (Statmodels,
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2019) and programmed in python 3 as shown in listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1 Estimating sample size
from s t a t s m o d e l s . s t a t s . power import TTes t IndPower
# p a r a m e t e r s f o r power a n a l y s i s
e f f e c t = 0 . 9 9
a l p h a = 0 . 0 1
power = 0 . 9 9
# E s t i m a t e sample s i z e
a n a l y s i s = TTes t IndPower ( )
r e s u l t = a n a l y s i s . so lve_power ( e f f e c t , power=power ,
nobs1=None , r a t i o = 1 . 0 , a l p h a = a l p h a )
p r i n t ( ’ Sample S i z e : %.3 f ’ % r e s u l t )
Fig. 3.3 Power of Test
Given, the values of effect size, alpha, and power to the TTestIndPower along with
its solve_power class it gives the value for the estimated sample size. For this study, the
estimated sample size was 50.733. Therefore, 50 samples was chosen as the sample size
for this research. Since data will be collected from ten machines; each machine, will have 5
trails consisting of 50 samples in each trial. The plot between statistical power and number
of observations, that is, sample size is plotted as seen in figure 3.3.
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3.3.5 Data Collection and Pre-Processing
The data was collected from ten computers and later stored in ten USB 2.0 devices with 128
MB storage capacity. Each of the ten computers had the same specification, Windows 10 OS,
16 GB RAM, Intel i7-9700 (3 GHz, 8 cores) processor. The data collection was divided into
control group and experimental group. The control group contains three memory forensic
acquisition tools, FTK Imager, Magnet RAM Capturer, and Belkasoft RAM Capture, and
one non-forensic tool TankiOnline (Tanki, 2018). The reason for opting for the non-forensic
tool TankiOnline was it is a free computer game software which can be run on a Windows 10
machine, and to see if any of the ML classifiers would be able to differentiate between this
game software and a forensic tool(s) in both the groups when executed on a Windows 10
machine.
The experimental group consists of the three aforementioned forensic tools only. In the
control group, the forensic tools and the non-forensic tool is executed but are not imaging
memory, and hence there is no memory acquisition taking place. Whereas, in the experimental
group the forensic tools are executed to acquire memory from the machines. As for the order
of execution, firstly the forensic tools in the experimental group were executed in the order of
Magnet, FTK, and Belkasoft as shown in listing 3.2. Then, after the experimental group data
has been collected, the forensic tools in the control group were executed in the same order as
experimental group, followed by the execution of the non-forensic tool TankiOnline. The
data was collected in the same order as mentioned previously on all ten machines by inserting
a USB device, which contained the data collection script for each machine. Therefore, the
experiment is being repeated exactly the same manner on all the ten machines. Whilst the
tools were executed on the machines, the MIOC parameters concerning to the tools in the
experimental group and control group were collected. The data collection procedure is shown























Fig. 3.4 Data Collection Procedure
The MIOC parameters are gathered with the help of an USB device. It is a good practice
guideline to image the physical memory using an USB device on which a forensic acquisition
tool is present Williams (2012). When the USB device is inserted into the USB port of the
computer, the memory acquisition (MA) automator block is executed. In the MA automator,
the forensic tools and a non-forensic tool automatically get executed. Now, the control group
tools get executed if memory is not being acquired. Or else, if memory is being acquired then
experimental group tools get executed. Python 3 scripts were written to execute the tools in
both groups. Part of the data collection (DC) code for the experimental group is shown in
listing 3.2.
Listing 3.2 DC Python Code for Experimental Group
def expgrp ( ) :
. . .
f o r j in range ( k ) :
p r i n t ( a r r a y [ j ] )
i f ( a r r a y [ j ]== " Magnet " ) :
procname = " MagnetRAMCapture "
MagCap ( v o l )
e l i f ( a r r a y [ j ]== " Ftk " ) :
procname = "FTK"
FtkCap ( v o l )
e l i f ( a r r a y [ j ]== " B e l k a s o f t " ) :
procname = " RamCapture64 "
BelkaCap ( v o l )
. . .
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The explanation for the code in listing 3.2 is as follows: when the exgrp() function
is called, the for loop iterates over the elements in the array. The array contains the list
of forensic tools namely FTK Imager, Magnet, and Belkasoft. In total there will be three
separate iterations in the experimental group. For example, during the first iteration, the
Magnet tool will be run, which is invoked by calling the autoexecution function, MagCap(vol).
Then, FtkCap(vol) and BelkaCap(vol) will be called respectively as shown in listing 3.2.
Fig. 3.5 Autoexecution of Magnet Forensic Software
The purpose of the autoexecution function is to automatically execute the forensic soft-
ware to acquire memory. In this case, as shown in figure 3.5, the path where the memory file
is to be stored is automatically selected by clicking on the browse button and then entering
the path. Then, the start button is clicked to capture memory without the user’s intevention.
The part of python code for Magnet’s autoexecution function is shown in listing 3.3.
Listing 3.3 Autoexecution code for Magnet
def Magcap ( v o l ) :
py au to = D i s p a t c h ( " AutoI tX3 . C o n t r o l " )
. . .
# c l i c k browse
py au to . WinAc t iva t e ( " Magnet RAM C a p t u r e " , " " ) ;
py au to . s l e e p ( 3 0 0 0 ) ;
# C o n t r o l C l i c k ( " t i t l e " , " t e x t " , c o n t r o l I D ,
b u t t o n , c l i c k s , x , y )
py au to . C o n t r o l C l i c k ( " Magnet RAM C a p t u r e " , " " ,
3 , " p r i m a r y " , 1 , 36 , 1 3 ) ;
. . .
# C l i c k aga in on s t a r t t o mem c a p t u r e
py au to . C o n t r o l C l i c k ( " Magnet RAM C a p t u r e " ,
" S t a r t " , 5 , " l e f t " , 1 , 4 4 , 1 6 ) ;. . .
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The autoexecution function makes use of AutoItX (Xu, 2016), which is an automation
framework for Windows operating system. Then the button co-ordinates are entered as
parameters to the ControlClick function which is used to click on browse button to enter the
memory image path, and then click on start button for forensic memory acquisition.
Once the forensic tool is executed and memory is being acquired, the MIOC parameters are
collected for that particular forensic tool. The code snippet for MIOC parameters collection
is shown in listing 3.4.
Listing 3.4 MIOC Parameters Collection
. . .
i f procname in p . i n f o [ ’ name ’ ] :
## C o l l e c t t h e memory p a r a m e t e r s f o r magnet p r o c e s s
l i s t 1 = p . m e m o r y _ f u l l _ i n f o ( ) [ 2 : ]
## c o l l e c t I /O p a r a m e t e r s
l i s t 2 = p . i o _ c o u n t e r s ( ) ;
#non−b l o c k i n g
m = ( p . c p u _ p e r c e n t ( i n t e r v a l =None ) / p s u t i l . cpu_coun t ( ) )
# b l o c k i n g
n = ( p . c p u _ p e r c e n t ( i n t e r v a l = 1 ) / p s u t i l . cpu_coun t ( ) )
## c o l l e c t cpu p a r a m e t e r s
l i s t 3 =[m, n ]
## c o l l e c t cpu p a r a m e t e r s
l i s t 4 = p . c p u _ t i m e s ( ) [ 0 : 2 ]
. . .
The collection of MIOC framework is facilitated by a python framework known as psutil
Rodola (2019). It provides functions such as memory_ f ull_in f o, io_counters, cpu_percent,
and cpu_parameters to gather MIOC parameters. The collection for each forensic tool were
split into five trials. Each trial in turn has fifty MIOC parameters collected with one second
difference between each MIOC parameter collection. The one second difference were chosen
because in 3.3.4, the sample size was determined to be 50, and the total time to make a
memory image for a Windows 10 OS with 16 GB of physical memory and Intel i7-9700
(3GHz, 8 core) processor is approximately 120 seconds. Therefore, each trial contains 50
samples, that is, 41 percent (50/120 = 0.41) of the memory data acquired. In other words,
this research intended to detect forensic memory acquistion within 50 seconds (less than a
minute) from its inception. During acquisition, the MIOC parameters were stored in excel
sheets because in this research python 3 libraries such as Pandas (Pan, 2020), which supports
data processing to and from the excel sheets. Data gathered from each computer were stored
in the respective USB device for data formatting purposes.
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Data Pre-processing
After MIOC parameters were stored into USB devices, data is processed into a format which
can be inputted to ML classifiers. Figure 3.6 shows the approach taken to format data. As
Fig. 3.6 Data Formatting Steps
already seen in section 3.3.5, the data is ogranised into experimental group and control group
in each USB device. The structure of a USB device as shown in figure 3.7. The data from
each USB is copied on to a computer for further processing. The USB folder contains two
main folders, ’Experimental Group’ and ’Control Group’ respectively. The Experimental
Group contain three forensic tool folders namely Belkasoft, Ftk, and Magnet, and each of
these forensic tool folders contain the trial folder containing of fifty excel sheets namely
writing1.xls to writing50.xls. It is in these excel sheets the MIOC parameters are stored.
For example, writing1.xls contains MIOC parameters when the Belkasoft forensic tool was
acquiring memory as shown in figure 3.8.
In the second step, the data from the ′USB/ExperimentalGroup/Belkaso f t/Trial1/′
location is read in a loop. This loop iterates over the fifty excel sheets, five Trial folders, and
three forensic tools in the Experimental Group Folder and stores the sorted MIOC parameters
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Fig. 3.7 USB Structure
Fig. 3.8 MIOC Parameters of writing1.xls
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in the folder ′RealCombineAnalysis/CPU_Params/′. For example, the CPU parameters
are sorted as shown in figure 3.9a. A python snippet showing the implementation of the
aforementioned steps is shown in listing 3.5.
Listing 3.5 MIOC Parameters Arrangement
. . .
f o r t in range ( 0 , l e n ( t o o l _ l i s t ) ) :
f o r k in range ( 0 , l e n ( memparam_l i s t ) ) :
f o r j in range ( 1 , 6 ) :
f o r i in range ( 1 , 5 1 ) :
d f = pd . r e a d _ e x c e l
( p a t h _ t o _ u s b _ e x p g r p )
d f . t o _ c s v ( p a t h _ t o _ f i l e _ l o c )
. . .
It consists of four for loops with their respectively variables t, k, j, and i. The variable t
iterates over the forensic tool list. This would be three for experimental group as it consists
of three forensic tools. The second variable k iterates over the parameters that were captured
for the forensic tools whilst they were acquiring memory in case of experimental group and
not acquiring memory in case of control group. The value of k depends on which MIOC
parameter is being addressed. For example, for CPU parameters the value of k is four since it
consists of four parameters. Therefore, in listing 3.5, the for loop iterates over the list for
four times. The next variable j iterates over the Trial folders as shown in figure 3.7. The final
parameter i iterates over fifty excel sheets present in the Trial folder.
For example, after the individual CPU parameter has been sorted as shown in figure 3.9,
it is further sorted in such a way that the four CPU parameters form the features or distinctive
native attributes (DNA) for both the experimental group and the control group.The four
DNAs are arranged in four columns, and the fifth column is attributed to the class name.
Now, the datasets of experimental group and control group as shown in figure 3.10 are joined
to form the final dataset. These datasets were used as inputs to various ML agorithms as
discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, these datasets were transformed to images and then
analysed using 3L-CNNs.
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(a) CPU Parameter arrang-
ment
(b) Blocking CPU parameter of block-
ing.xls
Fig. 3.9 Folder Structure of CPU Parameters
(a) Experimental Group Dataset (b) Control Group Dataset
Fig. 3.10 CPU datasets for Experimental and Control Group
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3.3.6 Model Evaluation and Interpretation
In this research, the metrics used for evaluating and interpreting the machine learning
models are the confusion matrix, true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) and
triangulating these results (Heale and Forbes, 2013) with area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve, precision-recall curves, learning curves, and bias-variance trade-
off, and these terms are explained in the following sections.
Confusion Matrix
A confusion matrix (CM) summarises the performance of a classification algorithm. In this
research since multiclassification performance is measured, evaluating accuracy alone can
be misleading because classification accuracy hides details that are used to understand a
model’s performance (Hossin and Sulaiman, 2015). For example, when the data has more
than 2 classes, a classification accuracy of 90 percent or more could be encountered, but what
can be hidden is whether all classes are predicted well or are there any classes that has been
ignored by the model. Therefore, interpreting a confusion matrix can give a better idea of
a classification model’s performance. The library package sklearn (sklearnCM, 2019) was
used to generate confusion matrices in this study. There are two cases for a confusion matrix,
an ideal and non-ideal case as shown in figure 3.11a and 3.11b respectively.
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(a) Ideal CM (b) non-ideal CM
Fig. 3.11 Confusion Matrix
Consider the ideal CM in figure 3.11a, the colour bar is an indicator of the magnitude of
each and every element in the CM. Darker the colour higher the magnitude of an element
in the CM, and lighter the colour lesser the magnitude of an element. For an ideal CM, its
diagonal elements will have darker colour. This is because the diagonal of a CM represents
true positives, and the columns represents false negatives, and the rows represent false
positives. Whereas, in the non-ideal case in figure 3.11b, at least one of the diagonal elements
in the CM will not have a dark colour, and a row or column element will have a darker colour
indicating that misclassification has taken place. The accuracy, precision and recall can be
calculated from the confustion matrix (sklearnCM, 2019).
Accuracy
Accuracy is the most widely used evaluation metric for classification performance. It is
defined as the ratio between correctly classified samples (T P+ T N) to total number of
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positive and negative samples.
Acc =
T P+T N
T P+T N +FP+FN
The error rate can be calculated from accuracy as, ERR = 1−Acc = (FP+FN)/(T P+
T N +FP+FN). The error rate which is also known as the misclassification rate gives the
number of misclassified samples from both positive and negative cases. The drawback with
accuracy is two classifiers can have the same accuracy yet have incorrect predictions (Hossin
and Sulaiman, 2015).
Sensitivity or True Positive Rate (TPR)
Sensitivity, TPR, or recall is the number of correctly classified positive samples to the total
number of positive samples. On the other hand, specificity or true negative rate (TNR), which
is the the inverse of recall is the ratio of negative samples that are correctly classified to the
total number of negative samples. Therefore, specificity is the proportion of negative samples
that were classified correctly, and sensitivity is the proportion of positive samples that were
classified correctly. Sensitivity is dependent on TPs and FNs which are present in the same
row of the confusion matrix (Hossin and Sulaiman, 2015). Similarly, specificity depends on




Positive and Negative Predictive Value
Positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) is the reflection of
the prediction’s performance. PPV or precision is the proportion of positive samples that
have been classified correctly to the total number of positive predicted samples as shown in
equation 3.4. Whereas, the NPV which is also known as inverse precision or true negative
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(a) ROC Curve (b) P-R Curve
Fig. 3.12 ROC and P-R Curves
accuracy is the measure of the proportion of negative samples that have been classified
correctly to the total number of samples that were negatively predicted. False discovery rate
(FDR) and False omission rate (FOR) metrics are inverses of PPV and NPV respectively





ROC and PR curves
The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and Precision-Recall
curve, in a multiclassification setting will show how each class has performed. In this
research, it is used to cross-validate the results of the confusion matrix. ROC curve is a plot
between true positive rate and false positive rate, whereas Precision-Recall (P-R) curve is a
plot between true positive rate and positive predictive value. In the example figure 3.12, the
ROC and P-R curve show that class 0 and class 1 are the most effect when compared to other
classes for that particular model (Hossin and Sulaiman, 2015).
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Learning Curves and Bias-Variance Tradeoff
Learning curves tell us that whether a model has overfit, underfit, or is a good fit to the data.
The learning curves are shown in figure 3.13. The learning curve is a plot between training
sample size and, training and cross-validation error.
(a) Good fit to the data (b) High bias
Fig. 3.13 Learning Curves
As the training size increases, if the training and cross- validation error decreases then it
means that the model has learnt the relevant characteristics from the data as shown in figure
3.13a. Another case that is most likely to occur is as the training size increases, the training
and validation errors do not decrease and ends up converging at point which has some amount
of significant error as shown in figure 3.13b, which means the model exhibits bias and has
underfit the data. If the curves diverge from each other it is said to exhibit variance and will
overfit the data. The formula used to measure the bias and variance in a model is:
Error = bias2 + variance+noise (3.5)
The third term in equation 3.5, noise, is also known as the irreducible error and it cannot be
controlled in an experiment. The first term, square of the bias is the average error in exhibited
in the model, and the second term variance tells us how much the input varies depending on
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the training set. It is possible to change bias and variance in an experiment, but an important
point to note is that decreasing bias will increase the variance and vice-versa. Therefore,
one of the goals in an experiment is to find a model that exhibits optimal bias and variance,
(Stephen, 2014).
3.3.7 Supporting and Modifying Hypothesis
In this research, the hypothesis was supported, modified, or rejected by obtaining the results
and comparing them to the threshold values. The criteria for choosing threshold values is
described below: In section 3.2, the step number five and six are iterable. This is one of the
important phases of the scientific method because it allows the modification of hypothesis
to fit with the observations provided the required consistency is achieved. In chapter 4, this
consistency is achieved by observing the results of the K-fold cross-validation, and in chapter
5, the number of epochs. The threshold value was determined from the observations of the
ML classifiers performance on the memory parameters dataset as shown in table 3.1. This
dataset was chosen as it consists of higher number of features (10) when compared to I/O
dataset (6 features), and CPU dataset (4 features). The size of the memory parameters dataset
is (17500,11), that is, 17500 rows, the first 10 coloumns consists of features, and the 11th
coloumn consists of the 7 classes. There are 3500 iterations for each class, hence the 17500
rows. (Bitbucket, 2020d).
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ML Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
ADA Boost 84.28 31.48 45.65 37.26 73.4
Decision Tree 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
Gaussian NB 96.74 89.31 88.4 88.85 18.4
Gradient Boost 99.99 99.98 99.98 99.98 <5
KNeighbours 99.99 99.97 99.97 99.97 <5
LDA 97.4 91.25 90.85 91.04 17.8
Random Forest 99.99 99.98 99.98 99.98 <5
SVM 91.68 62.88 49.78 55.56 40.0
Table 3.1 Threshold Values
From table 3.1, three ML classifiers have their detection error rate less than 5 percent.
This was the first criteria and threshold value that was chosen because, the detection error
rate was calculated from the bias-variance trade-off rather than complementing the accuracy,
that is, (1-accuracy). The accuracies for the four ML classifiers are equal, but their precision
and recall vary. In this group, KNeighbours has the least precision, recall, and F-measure and
will qualify for the threshold level setting. Hence, the rules this study proposes to determine
the threshold level are:
1. Select the ML classifiers with least detection error rate.
2. The ML classifier with least accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measure in that group
will be set as threshold values or levels. That is, if any ML classifier which is equal
or greater than the threshold level will support the hypothesis. Likewise, any ML
classifier below the threshold level will not support the hypothesis. In which case,
the hypothesis will be modified or rejected based on the consistency of the results
achieved.
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This study does not use the statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether there is a
significant difference between two groups because it will not satisfy the aforementioned
threshold level criteria, and may lead to misleading conclusions (Jason, 2016). For example,
if a t-test is used to find if there is difference in means between KNeighbours and LDA, the
result will fail to reject the null hypothesis as the p-value (0.016) is less than the significance
level (α) of 0.05 which means there is no difference between the two classifiers, but there is
a difference between KNeighbours and LDA based on the threshold values in table 3.1.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter the research method in AI and the scientific method were discussed. Then
a research method for this study had been proposed and justified after being informed by
the research approach in AI and the scientific method. The experiment had been designed
to gather and pre-process the data. Various evaluation techniques have been mentioned that
were used in chapter 4 and chapter 5 to evaluate a model. Finally, the threshold values
selection are justified based on which the hypothesis is supported, modified or rejected.
Chapter 4
Detecting Forensic Memory Acquisition
using Machine Learning Algorithms
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the classification results of eight machine learning models are evaluated for
performance. These eight algorithms were chosen as it was found to be extensively used
in the literature in the field of cyber security and forensics as seen in section 2.5.1. The
metrics used for evaluating the machine learning models are true positive rate (TPR) and
false positive rate (FPR) which can be derived from the confusion matrix, and cross-checking
these results with the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, P-R
Curve, learning curve, and detection error rate of a machine learning model.
4.2 Detecting Memory Acquisition using Memory Param-
eters
In this section, the results of eight machine learning classifiers are analyzed to gather evidence
to support or reject the memory detection hypothesis. The machine learning classifiers will
be analyzed by metrics mentioned in section 3.3.6 by using confusion matrix, and various
curves to determine which ML classifier model fits the data well and which model does
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not fit the data well. Therefore this will result in wither falsifying, accepting, or modifying
the hypothesis. Since the classifiers will be used against memory parameters, the dataset is
explained briefly. Only a part of the memory parameter dataset is shown in figure 4.1. The
complete dataset can be found at (Bitbucket, 2020d) .
Fig. 4.1 Memory Dataset
The dataset consists of 17500 rows in total and 11 columns. Therefore, the size of dataset
is (17500,11). The first 10,000 rows relate to the iterations when the forensic tools were
executed but memory was not being acquired. And, the following rows consists of 7500
iterations when memory was being acquired by a forensic tool. During each iteration certain
memory parameters were gathered. These parameters, also known as features, are defined in
the following table 4.1
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Memory Parameter Description
Non-paged Pool Amount of memory a process is using that cannot be moved out to the pagefile and remains in memory.
Numpage The number of pagefaults
Paged_Pool Amount of memory a process is using in pageable memory region.
Pagefile The data that is not stored in the physical memory
Peak_nonpaged_pool Maximum value of nonpaged pool in bytes
Peak_paged_pool Maximum value of paged pool in bytes
Peak_pagefile Maximum value of pagefile
Peak_wset Peak value of Wset
Unique set size (USS) Memory that is freed when a process terminates. Every process has its own USS.
Wset The non-swapped memory a process has utilised. It is also known as resident set size.
Table 4.1 Memory Parameters
AdaBoost Classifier
The model is evaluated based on confusion matrix (Mem, 2020b), and then cross-checked
with ROC curve (Mem, 2020d), P-R curve (Mem, 2020c), and bias-variance trade-off (Mem,
2020a). The confusion matrix clearly distinguishes between FPs and FNs as shown in figure
4.2. From confusion matrix it is observed that classes 0, 2, and 6 are severly effected as
they have 0 TPs, and this in turn affects the performance of other classes, for example, even
though class 1 has been classified around 472 of it instances, but it has misclassified around
552 instances. Similarly, class 4 has correctly identified around 492 classifiers, but it has
misclassified about 1031 instances. It appears only class 3 and 5 have fit the data well.
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Fig. 4.2 Confusion Matrix for AdaBoost Classifier
To further support the results from the confusion matrix, the results of ROC curve in
figure 4.3a shows that except for classes 3 and 5, the other classes are below the threshold
level. Also the P-R curve have low values for classes other than 3 and 5, which indicates
these classes have either high FPs or FNs, and have been misclassified as confirmed from the
results of the confusion matrix. Also, classes 0, 2, 4 and 6 have high recall, but low precision.
This means, the model is able to identify all instances of those classes, but out of those
instances which were identified, only around 30 to 40 percent of them have been correctly
detected. And, these poor results are either due to higher number of FPs and FNs as seen in
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(a) ROC curve for AdaBoost (b) Precision-Recall Curve for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.3 ROC and P-R Curves for AdaBoost
the confusion matrix in fig 4.2. Therefore, the results of AdaBoost classifier model is poor at
detecting memory acquisition, and hence falsifies the hypothesis. As for the bias-variance
tradeoff, the learning curve for AdaBoost classifier as shown in figure 4.4a, and it is seen that
it has high variance as the training error is lesser than the validation error, and high bias as
both the curves converge at a point higher than the threshold value. Therefore, increasing
the number of samples will not improve the model’s performance. Hence, this model is not
suited to detect forensic memory acquisition.
And the bias-variance decomposition plots in figure 4.4b show bias and variance are
above threshold values. This is the reason why AdaBoost classifier has higher number of FPs
and FNs, and lower precision. The detection error rate (∆r) is calculated as the sum of bias
and variance. For AdaBoost, ∆r is 73.46 percent which is high. Therefore, AdaBoost is not
good at detecting forensic memory acquisition using memory parameters.
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(a) Learning Curve for AdaBoost (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.4 Learning and B-V Curves for AdaBoost
GaussianNB
The confusion matrix clearly distinguishes between FPs and FNs as shown in figure 4.5.
From confusion matrix it is observed that classes 0, and 1 are severly effected as class 0 has
280 FPs and 86 FNs, whereas other classes for this model have performed well. It appears
only class 0 and 1 do not fit the data well.
To further support the results from the confusion matrix in figure 4.5, the results of ROC
curve (Gau, 2020d) in figure 4.6a shows that except for classes 0 and 1, the other classes
perform well. Also the P-R curve in figure 4.6b have low values for classes 0 and 1, which
indicates these classes have either high FPs or FNs, and have been misclassified as confirmed
from the results of the confusion matrix. These poor results are either due to higher number
of FPs and FNs as seen in the confusion matrix in figure 4.5. Therefore, the results of
GaussianNB classifier model is poor at detecting memory acquisition, and hence falsifies the
hypothesis. As for the bias-variance tradeoff in figure 4.7, the learning curve for GaussianNB
classifier as shown in figure 4.7a, and it is seen that the variances decreases as the training
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Fig. 4.5 GaussianNB confusion matrix
(a) ROC curve for GaussianNB (b) Precision-Recall Curve for GaussianNB
Fig. 4.6 ROC and P-R Curves for GaussianNB
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(a) Learning Curve for GaussianNB (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.7 Learning and B-V Curves for AdaBoost
size increases, but the both the curves converge at a point greater than the threshold value
indicating that this model exhibits bias.
And the bias-variance decomposition plots in figure 4.7b show bias and variance are
above threshold values. This is the reason why GaussianNB classifier has of FPs and FNs,
and lower precision and recall. The detection error rate (∆r) is calculated as the sum of bias
and variance. For GaussianNB, ∆r is 18.4 percent. Therefore, GaussianNB is not good at
detecting forensic memory acquisition using memory parameters. LDA classifier also shows
similar performance to GaussianNB and has a ∆r value of 17.8 percent. LDA also does not
perform well in detecting memory acquisition.
SVM
The confusion matrix clearly distinguishes between FPs and FNs as shown in figure 4.8.
From confusion matrix it is observed that classes 0, and 1 are severly effected as class 0 has
zero TPs and has 520 FNs, and class 1 has 1023 FPs. This means class 1 has misclassfied
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Fig. 4.8 SVM confusion matrix
520 instances of class 0 and 500 instances of class 5. The other classes for this model have
performed well. It appears only class 0 and 1 do not fit the data well.
To further support the results from the confusion matrix in figure 4.8, the results of ROC
curve in figure 4.9a shows that except for classes 0 and 1, the other classes perform well.
Also the P-R curve in figure 4.9b have low values for classes 0 and 1, which indicates these
classes have either high FPs or FNs, and have been misclassified as confirmed from the
results of the confusion matrix. These poor results are either due to higher number of FPs and
FNs as seen in the confusion matrix in figure 4.8. Therefore, the results of SVM classifier
model is poor at detecting memory acquisition, and hence falsifies the hypothesis. As for
the bias-variance tradeoff in figure 4.10, the learning curve for AdaBoost classifier as shown
in figure 4.10a, and it is seen that it has high variance as the training error is lesser than
the validation error, and high bias as both the curves converge at a point higher than the
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(a) ROC curve for SVM (b) Precision-Recall Curve for SVM
Fig. 4.9 ROC and P-R Curves for SVM
threshold value. Therefore, increasing the number of samples will not improve the model’s
performance. Hence, this model is not suited to detect forensic memory acquisition.
And the bias-variance decomposition plots in figure 4.10b show bias and variance are
above threshold values. This is the reason why SVM classifier has higher number of FPs
and FNs, and lower precision. The detection error rate (∆r) is calculated as the sum of bias
and variance. For AdaBoost, ∆r is 40 percent which is high. Therefore, SVM is not good at
detecting forensic memory acquisition using memory parameters.
The rest of the ML classifiers Decision Tree, Gradient Boost, K-Neighbours and Random
Forest perform well as they have ideal CM, high precision and recall, and optimal bias and
variance as shown in table 4.2. Forensically, what this means is that, during the acquisition
phase, for example, when the investigator is acquiring memory from a machine using the
forensic tool FTK Imager, a high performing ML classifier such as Random Forest could
detect memory acquisition with higher accuracy. And when memory acquisition is detected,
then the attacker could proceed on to the next phase to defeat the acquisition process by
shutting the machine down programatically as demonstrated in section 2.4.
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(a) Learning Curve for SVM (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.10 Learning and B-V Curves for AdaBoost
ML Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
ADA Boost 84.28 31.48 45.65 37.26 73.4
Decision Tree 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
Gaussian NB 96.74 89.31 88.4 88.85 18.4
Gradient Boost 99.99 99.98 99.98 99.98 <5
KNeighbours 99.99 99.97 99.97 99.97 <5
LDA 97.4 91.25 90.85 91.04 17.8
Random Forest 99.99 99.98 99.98 99.98 <5
SVM 91.68 62.88 49.78 55.56 40.0
Table 4.2 ML classifier comparison for Memory Features
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4.3 Detecting Memory Acquisition using I/O Parameters
As for I/O parameters dataset, the size of the dataset is (17500,7), with 10,000 row iterations
for the NAM category and 7500 iterations for the the AM category. Only part of the dataset
with first 12 rows consisting of the FTK-NAM category is shown in figure 4.11.
Fig. 4.11 IO Dataset
The complete I/O dataset is made available at bitbucket repository (Bitbucket, 2020b)
for this research. There are 6 features in total for I/O parameters which are described in
appendix C.1. The performance of SVM is poor when compared to RF classifier. First
the confusion matrix will be analyzed to see what classes are affected the most, then ROC
and P-R curves will be compared against each other to further support the results from the
confusion matrix. Then by analysing learning curves and bias-variance decomposition curves
the detection error rate is computed which further sheds light on the classifier’s performance.
As for SVM, the confusion matrix (SVM, 2020b) as shown in figure 4.12 during the first fold
is considered, it can be seen that the classes 1, 3, 5 and 6 and majorily affected. This is due
the fact that their either have higher number of FPs or FNs. For example, even though class 1
has correctly classified 472 instances whilst misclassifying 1544 of its instances which are
FPs. It has misclassified around 13 instances of class 0, 10 instances of class 2, 492 instances
of class 3, 502 and 532 instances of class 5 and class 6 respectively. Thereby, a total of 1544
misclassification instances. Which reflects that SVM does not do well detecting class 1. And
for classes 3, 5 and 6 they have zero FPs. Now, if the ROC (SVM, 2020d) and P-R curves
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Fig. 4.12 Confusion Matrix for SVM Classifier
(a) ROC curve for SVM (b) Precision-Recall Curve for SVM
Fig. 4.13 ROC and P-R Curves for SVM
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(a) Learning Curve for SVM (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for SVM
Fig. 4.14 Learning and B-V Curves for SVM
(SVM, 2020c) for the first fold are compared, it is seen that the ROC curve shows that only
classes 3 and 5 are affected which contradicts the results of the confusion matrix. Whereas,
the P-R curve shows classes 1, 3, and 5 are affected but not class 6. Therefore, the results
from the confusion matrix will be relied upon for only this case.
The learning curve (SVM, 2020a) shows that this model has high variance about 8000
training samples, and overall has a high bias as it is well above the threshold level. Also,
high spikes at various points can be seen in bias-variance tradeoff graph of SVM as shown
in figure 4.14 which indicates and further supports the results of the learning curve that this
model does indeed suffer from high variance and high bias. Therefore, this model will not
perform well at detecting memory acquisition when I/O parameters are used.
AdaBoost
As for AdaBoost, the confusion matrix (Ada, 2020d) as shown in figure 4.15, it can be
seen that the classes, 1, 3, 5, and 6 are majorly affected. This is due the fact that their
either have higher number of FPs or FNs. For example, even though class 2 has correctly
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Fig. 4.15 Confusion Matrix for AdaBoost Classifier
classified 472 instances whilst misclassifying 1510 of its instances which are FPs. It has
misclassfied around 520 instances of class 0, 490 instances of class 3, and 500 instances of
class 5. Thereby, a total of 1510 misclassification instances which reflects that AdaBoost
does not do well detecting class 1 and classes 3, 5 and 6 as they have zero FPs.
Now, if the ROC (Ada, 2020h) and P-R curves (Ada, 2020f) in 4.16 for the first fold are
compared, it is seen that the ROC curve shows that 0, 1, 3, 5, and 6 is effected. This validates
the results of the confusion matrix. As seen from the result of confusion matrix, that class 1
was the most effected class with 1510 FPs, this result is again supported by ROC curve in
figure 4.16a and the P-R curve in 4.16b which has an area of just 0.26, which indicates that
class 1 did not perform well.
The learning curve shows that this model has high variance until 9000 training samples,
and overall has a high bias as it is well above the threshold level. Also, high spikes at
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(a) ROC curve for AdaBoost (b) Precision-Recall Curve for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.16 ROC and P-R Curves for AdaBoost
various points can be seen in bias-variance tradeoff graph of AdaBoost as shown in figure
4.17 which indicates and further supports the results of the learning curve that this model
does indeed suffer from high variance and high bias with a detection error rate (∆r) of 23.8
percent. Therefore, this model will not perform well at detecting memory acquisition when
I/O parameters are used.
GaussianNB
As for GaussianNB, the confusion matrix as shown in figure 4.18, it can be seen that the
classes 1, 3, and 5 and affected. This is due the fact that their either have higher number of
FPs or FNs. For example, even though class 2 has correctly classified 472 instances whilst
misclassifying 569 of its instances which are FPs. It has misclassified around 69 instances
of class 3, and 500 instances of class 5. Which reflects that GaussianNB does not do well
detecting class 1 and, classes 3 and 5 as they have zero FPs.
Now, if the ROC and P-R curves in 4.19 for the first fold are compared, it is seen that the
ROC curve shows that 0, 1, 3, and 5 are effected. This validates the results of the confusion
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(a) Learning Curve for AdaBoost (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.17 Learning and B-V Curves for AdaBoost
matrix. As seen from the result of confusion matrix, that class 1 was the most effected class
with 569 FPs, this result is again supported by ROC curve in figure 4.19a and the P-R curve
in 4.19b which has an area of just 0.79, which is the lowest when compared to other classes.
The learning curve (Ada, 2020b) shows that this model has high variance upto 8000
training samples, and overall has a bias as it is above the threshold level. Also, high spikes at
various points can be seen in bias-variance tradeoff graph of GaussianNB as shown in figure
4.20 which indicates and further supports the results of the learning curve that this model does
indeed suffer from variance and bias with a detection error rate (∆r) of 19 percent. Therefore,
this model will not perform well at detecting memory acquisition when I/O parameters are
used.
LDA
As for LDA, the confusion matrix (LDA, 2020d)as shown in figure 4.21, it can be seen that
the classes 1, 3, and 5 and affected. This is due the fact that their either have higher number
of FPs or FNs. For example, even though class 1 has correctly classified 472 instances whilst
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Fig. 4.18 Confusion Matrix for GaussianNB Classifier
(a) ROC curve for GaussianNB (b) Precision-Recall Curve for GaussianNB
Fig. 4.19 ROC and P-R Curves for GaussianNB
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(a) Learning Curve for GaussianNB (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for GaussianNB
Fig. 4.20 Learning and B-V Curves for GaussianNB
misclassifying 73 of its instances which are FPs. That is, it has misclassified 73 instances of
class 1. Whereas, class 3 whilst having classified 430 of its instances, it has misclassified
32 instances of class 2 and 490 instances of class 5. This leads to class 5 having zero FPs.
Which reflects that LDA does not do well detecting class 1 and, classes 3 and 5 as they have
zero FPs.
Now, if the ROC (LDA, 2020h) and P-R curves (LDA, 2020f) in 4.22 for the first fold
are compared, it is seen that the ROC curve shows that classes 1, 3, and 5 are effected. This
validates the results of the confusion matrix. As seen from the result of confusion matrix,
that class 3 was the most effected class with 490 FPs, this result is again supported by ROC
curve in figure 4.22a and the P-R curve in figure 4.22b which has an area of just 0.35, which
is the lowest when compared to other classes.
The learning curve (LDA, 2020b) shows that this model has high variance upto 12000
training samples, and overall has a bias as it is above the threshold level. Also, high spikes at
various points can be seen in bias-variance tradeoff graph of LDA as shown in figure 4.23
which indicates and further supports the results of the learning curve that this model does
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Fig. 4.21 Confusion Matrix for LDA Classifier
(a) ROC curve for LDA (b) Precision-Recall Curve for LDA
Fig. 4.22 ROC and P-R Curves for LDA
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(a) Learning Curve for LDA (b) Bias-Variance Decomposition for LDA
Fig. 4.23 Learning and B-V Curves for LDA
indeed suffer from variance and bias with a detection error rate (∆r) of 78 percent. Therefore,
this model will not perform well at detecting memory acquisition when I/O parameters
are used. The rest of the ML classifiers Decision Tree, Gradient Boost, K-Neighbours and
RandomForest perform well as they have ideal CM, high precision and recall, and optimal
bias and variance as shown in table 4.3. When compared to memory parameters, the I/O
parameters perform well, and this has an impact on what parameters to use to defeat the
forensic acquisition process. For example, to accqurately detect forensic memory acquisiton
with higher precision, recall and lower detection rate, an attacker would choose to execute
the detection using a ML classifier such as random forest. And after detection, the forensic
memory acquisition process could be defeated by passively shutting the machine down as
seen in section 2.4.
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ML Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
AdaBoost 89.25 51.48 62.82 56.58 23.8
Decision Tree 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
GaussianNB 96.17 81.91 86.68 84.22 19
Gradient Boost 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
KNeighbours 99 99 99 99 <5
LDA 94.37 75.62 80.88 78.16 78
Random Forest 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
SVM 87.51 46.22 56.37 50.79 15.7
Table 4.3 Comparison of ML Classifiers based on I/O features
4.4 Detecting Memory Acquisition using CPU Parameters
In this section, only the analysis of top three least performing models are discussed. When
compared to memory parameters and I/O parameters, all models do not perform well using
CPU parameters. The reason for this could be fewer number of features in the CPU parameters
(Appendix C.2). The size of the CPU dataset is (17500, 5) and the first 10000 row iterations
belong to the NAM category and the next 7500 iterations belong to the AM category.
Fig. 4.24 CPU Dataset
Only a part of the dataset is shown in figure. The complete CPU dataset is available on
the bitbucket repository (Bitbucket, 2020a). Behaviour of the models are discussed next
followed with the performance metrics which is shown in table 4.4.
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Fig. 4.25 Confusion Matrix for AdaBoost Classifier
Ada Boost
The Ada Boost model shows the least performance when compared to other models. When
analysing the confusion matrix of Ada Boost classifier (Ada, 2020c)as shown in figure 4.25,
it can be seen that for the first fold classes 0, 1, 2, 4, and 5 are highly affected. Class 0, 2, and
5 have 505 FNs, whilst class 1 has 505 FPs. Among all classes, class 4 is majorly effected
with 982 FPs and 64 FNs. The results of the confusion matrix shows that this model’s
performance is poor. To further support this result, the ROC (Ada, 2020g) and P-R curves
(Ada, 2020e) will be compared, and also the learning curve and bias-variance decomposition
graphs will be analyzed to guage the type of bias and variance this model exhibits and the
detection error rate respectively. When ROC and P-R curves are compared together as seen
in figure 4.26, it is observed that classes 0, 1,2, 4, and 5 are effected. As seen during the
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(a) ROC curve for AdaBoost (b) Precision-Recall Curve for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.26 ROC and P-R Curves for AdaBoost
analysis of confusion matrix that class 4 has been highly effected due to higher number of
FPs, this result is supported by ROC curve which shows that class 4 has the least area under
the curve, and class 4 also has the least precision and recall with area under the P-R curve
being 0.30 which is low. Therefore, the comparison of ROC and P-R curves further support
the results from confusion matrix with regards to the classes effected dur to FPs and FNs.
The learning curve (Ada, 2020a) in figure 4.27a shows this model suffers with high
variance and high bias. The model exhibits high variance upto 8000 samples and continues
to have variance. It has high bias as both the curves meet at approximately at a 50 percent
error value with a detection error rate (∆r) of 99 percent. Therefore, this model does not
perform well using CPU parameters.
In table 4.4 the performance of all ML classifiers are shown. Also, in table 4.4 it can be seen
that all ML classifiers do not perform well using CPU parameters.
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(a) Learning curve for AdaBoost (b) Bias-Variance Curve for AdaBoost
Fig. 4.27 LC and B-V Curves for AdaBoost
ML Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
AdaBoost 60.58 46.11 53.51 49.53 79
Decision Tree 97.2 89.97 89.91 89.93 17
GaussianNB 95.34 84.45 83.65 84.04 36
Gradient Boost 97.42 91.08 91.17 91.12 13
K Neighbours 96.25 90.65 87.28 88.93 19
LDA 91.37 66.91 70.02 68.42 81
Random Forest 95.34 84.45 83.65 84.04 14
SVM 94.57 74.94 81.14 77.91 28
Table 4.4 Performance of ML Classifiers for CPU features
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Fig. 4.28 Confusion Matrix for GaussianNB Classifier
GaussianNB
When analysing the confusion matrix of GaussianNB classifier (Gau, 2020b) as shown in
figure 4.28, it can be seen that classes 0, 1, 2, 4, and 5 are affected. Class 0, 1 and 2 have 79,
270, and 100 FPs respectively. Whereas, classes 1 and 5 have 137 and 276 FNs respectively.
The results of the confusion matrix shows that this model’s performance is poor. To further
support this result, the ROC and P-R curves will be compared, and also the learning curve and
bias-variance decomposition graphs will be analyzed to guage the type of bias and variance
this model exhibits and the detection error rate respectively. When ROC (Gau, 2020e)and
P-R curves (Gau, 2020c) in figure 4.29 are compared together, it is observed that classes 0, 1,
4, and 5 are effected. As seen during the analysis of confusion matrix that class 1 and 5 have
been effected due to higher number of FNs, this result is supported by ROC curve which
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(a) ROC curve for GaussianNB (b) Precision-Recall Curve for GaussianNB
Fig. 4.29 ROC and P-R Curves for GaussianNB
shows that class 1 and 5 have the least area under the curve when compared to other classes,
and class 1 and 5 also has the least precision and recall with area under the P-R curve being
0.63 and 0.68 respectively, which is low. Therefore, the comparison of ROC and P-R curves
further support the results from confusion matrix with regards to the classes effected dur to
FPs and FNs. The learning curve (Gau, 2020a) in figure 4.30a shows this model suffers with
variance and bias. The model exhibits variance up to 12000 samples. It has high bias as both
the curves meet at 20 percent error value with a detection rate of ∆r of 36 percent. Therefore,
this model does not perform well using CPU parameters.
LDA
When analysing the confusion matrix of LDA classifier (LDA, 2020c) as shown in figure
4.31, it can be seen that classes 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are affected. Class 0, 1, 2 and 4 have
56, 760, 71, and 96 FPs respectively. Whereas, classes 0 and 5 have 130 and 500 FNs
respectively. The results of the confusion matrix shows that this model’s performance is poor.
To further support this result, the ROC (LDA, 2020g) and P-R curves (LDA, 2020e) will
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(a) Learning curve for GaussianNB (b) Bias-Variance Curve for GaussianNB
Fig. 4.30 LC and B-V Curves for GaussianNB
Fig. 4.31 Confusion Matrix for LDA Classifier
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(a) ROC curve for LDA (b) Precision-Recall Curve for LDA
Fig. 4.32 ROC and P-R Curves for LDA
be compared along with learning curve and bias-variance decomposition which will also
be analyzed to gauge the type of bias and variance this model exhibits and the detection
error rate respectively. When ROC and P-R curves in figure 4.32 are compared together, it is
observed that classes 0, 1, and 5 are effected. As seen during the analysis of confusion matrix
that class 0 and 5 have been effected due to higher number of FNs, this result is supported by
ROC curve which shows that class 1 and 5 have the least area under the curve when compared
to other classes, and class 1 and 5 also has the least precision and recall with area under the
P-R curve being 0.48 and 0.53 respectively, which is low. Therefore, the comparison of ROC
and P-R curves further support the results from confusion matrix with regards to the classes
effected due to FPs and FNs. The learning curve (LDA, 2020a) in figure 4.33a shows this
model suffers with variance and bias. The model exhibits variance upto 12000 samples. It
has high bias as both the curves meet at approximately at a 30 percent error value with a
detection error rate ∆r of 81 percent. Therefore, this model does not perform well using CPU
parameters.
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(a) Learning curve for LDA (b) Bias-Variance Curve for LDA
Fig. 4.33 LC and B-V Curves for LDA
4.5 Integrated Analysis of MIOC Parameters
The memory, I/O, and CPU (MIOC) parameters were combined to create one single dataset,
the MIOC dataset. The size of the dataset is (17500,21), it contains 20 features which
includes 10, 6, and 4 from memory, I/O, and CPU features respectively. The dataset is too
large to be included in this thesis. The MIOC dataset is available at the bitbucket repository
(Bitbucket, 2020c). The reason for combining all the three parameters was to observe if there
would be a decrease or increase in the performance of the ML classifiers. Table 4.5 shows
the comparison of performance of ML classifiers for integrated MIOC parameters.From this
table it can be seen that Ada Boost and SVM classifier have underperformed. Whereas, the
rest of the ML classifiers perform well. The reason for poor performance for both Ada Boost
and SVM classifiers is that they have low precision and recall as seen in figure 4.5. This is
due to the fact that they exhibit high bias and variance (Appendix A.1).
When compared to memory, I/O, and CPU parameters individually, the intergrated MIOC
parameters perform well. Table 4.6 shows the percentage increase of integrated MIOC
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ML Classifiers Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
Ada Boost 88.45 48.37 60 53.56 60.4
Decision Tree 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
GaussianNB 99.98 99.42 99.48 99.44 <5
Gradient Boost 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
KNeighbours 99.99 99.85 99.57 99.70 <5
LDA 99.98 99.4 99.37 99.38 <5
Random Forest 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 <5
SVM 91.62 61.68 70.65 65.86 71
Table 4.5 Integrated MIOC parameters performance
ML Classifiers Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
Ada Boost 4.17 16.89 14.35 15.51 -13
Decision Tree 0 0 0 0 0
GaussianNB 3.24 10.11 11.08 10.57 -17.9
Gradient Boost 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
KNeighbours 0 -0.12 -0.4 -0.18 0
LDA 2.58 8.15 8.52 8.33 -17.3
Random Forest 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
SVM -0.06 -1.2 20.87 -2.269 -32.9
Table 4.6 Percentage Increase over Memory Parameters
parameters performance when compared to memory parameters. Ada Boost classifier shows
an 4.17 percent increase in accuracy and, 16.89 and 14.35 percent increase in precision and
recall respectively. Whereas, the detection error rate (∆R) shows an 13 percent decrease,
which means this classifier detection performance is better when MIOC parameters are
combined compared to detecting memory acquisition individually with memory parameters.
Interestingly, SVM classifier shows a slight decrease in accuracy and precision, but this is
compensated by 20.87 increase in recall and 32.9 percent decrease in detection error rate.
Similarly, other classifiers also show an increase in performance when MIOC parameters
are combined. The only exception to this case is the KNeighbours classifier, which shows a
marginal decrease in precision and recall.
When compared to the I/O parameters in table 4.7, Ada Boost classifier’s detection error
rate decreases by 36.6 percent with slight increase in precision, recall, and accuracy which
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ML Classifiers Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
Ada Boost 0.8 3.11 2.82 2.95 -36.6
Decision Tree 0 0 0 0 0
GaussianNB -3.81 -17.51 -12.8 -14.78 14
Gradient Boost 0 0 0 0 0
KNeighbours -0.99 -0.85 -0.57 -0.68 0
LDA -5.61 -23.78 -18.49 20.80 73
Random Forest 0 0 0 0 0
SVM -4.11 -15.46 -14.28 -14.84 -55.3
Table 4.7 Percentage Increase over I/O Parameters
are 3.11, 2.82, and 0.8 percent respectively. Whereas, Gaussian NB and LDA show a major
decrease in performance. The accuracy, precision, and recall of GaussianNB decrease, which
increases the detection error rate by 14 percent. Similarly, for LDA the detection error rate
drastically increases by 73 percent with an decrease in accuracy, precision, and recall. The
performance of SVM classifier shows a strange result because as the accuracy, precision,
and recall increase, the detection error rate is expected to increase, but it decreases by 55.3
percent. The integrated parameters performance shows a significant increase in performance
over CPU parameters for all ML classifiers, but the only exception being SVM classifier
which shows a decrease in performance (table 4.8). The recall and precision decrease by
13.26 percent and 10.49 percent respectively which increases the detection error rate by
43 percent. When compared to all other ML classifiers except for SVM, they all show
an increase in accuracy, precision and recall, and a decrease in detection error rate. LDA
classifier shows a considerable decrease in detection error rate which is 76 percent followed
by Ada Boost with an decrease of 38.6 percent.
4.6 Conclusion
The analysis of the individual MIOC parameters results show that ADA boost and SVM
classifiers are not good at detecting forensic memory acquisition as various classes show
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ML Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Detection Error Rate
AdaBoost 27.87 2.26 6.49 3.35 -38.6
Decision Tree 2.79 10.02 10.08 10.04 -12
GaussianNB 4.64 14.97 15.83 15.38 -31
Gradient Boost 2.57 8.91 8.82 8.86 -8
K Neighbours 3.74 9.2 12.29 10.52 -14
LDA 8.61 32.49 29.35 30.84 -76
Random Forest 4.65 15.54 16.34 15.92 -9
SVM -2.95 -13.26 -10.49 -11.71 43
Table 4.8 Percentage increase over CPU Parameters
either higher number of false positive or false negative with lower precision and recall rates.
The reason for this higher FPs and FNs is that these models either have higher bias or vari-
ance. Therefore, these models are not recommended to detect forensic memory acquisition.
Whereas, the random forest classifier has fewer number of false positives and false negatives
across all folds, and also high precision and recall. This is because the classifier exhibits low
bias and variance, and hence Random Forest Classifier is recommended to detect forensic
memory acquisition.
When compared to the integrated MIOC parameters, performance of individual MIOC pa-
rameters show an increase in accuracy, precision and recall, and a decrease in the detection
error rate. This signifies the relevance of integrated MIOC parameters in addressing the
performance issues in individual MIOC parameters. In relation to digital forensic investi-
gation process, detecting forensic memory acquisition using integrated MIOC parameters
for example, could defeat the acquisition process by shutting down the machine. In which
case, the examiner will not have evidence pertaining to memory to work with. Also, instead
of shutting the machine down, if memory acquisition is detected, the evidence could be
tampered with, and this could make the investigator deduce false conclusions. Therefore,
defeating the forensic process of acquisition and analysis.

Chapter 5
Detecting Forensic Memory Acquisition
Patterns using Convolution Neural
Network
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, the results support the hypothesis mentioned in 3.3.2. This chapter proposes
another way to detect forensic memory acquisition to further support the results from Chapter
4. The approach used in this study is that of (Wang and Oates, 2015), who first proposed to
convert timeseries data to GAF images and then used tiled CNN to learn features from their
dataset. Their approach produced competitive results for a small parameter space. Therefore,
the MIOC data set is transformed into images and then a CNN model is used to identify the
DNA patterns in the datasets. The results show that the model detects DNA patterns from the
I/O data with a greater accuracy, precision, and recall when compared to memory and CPU
dataset respectively.
5.2 Distinctive Native Attribute Patterns
In this section, a method to transform features to distinctive native attribute (DNA) patterns is
presented. Features can be transformed to DNA patterns by encoding time series as images.
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In this thesis, the DNA patterns are generated by making use of gramian summation field
(GSF) aspect of the gramian angular field (GAF) (Wang and Oates, 2015). GAF can be used
to encode multivariate timeseries to DNA patterns as demonstrated in figure 5.1. In a GAF
conversion, first the timeseries in figure 5.1a is transformed to polar co-ordinate system as
shown in figure 5.1b, and then finally to GSF (Figure 5.1c). This process is explained in
detail in subsection 5.2.1.
5.2.1 Gramian Angular Field
Let the timeseries data be represented as X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} where all the data elements of






Now, to represent the rescaled timeseries X̄ in polar co-ordinate system, the values must
be encoded by angular cosine (φ ) and time-intervals as the radius as shown in equation 5.2:




, ti ∈ N
(5.2)
In equation 5.2, ti is the time interval between data values, and N is the constant that is
used to regularize the span of polar co-ordinate system. The advantage of equation 5.2 is that
when compared to the cartesian co-ordinate system, polar co-ordinates preserve temporal
relations. Now, the angular properties of the rescaled timeseries can be utilized by taking the
trigonometric sum between each point within time intervals to identify temporal correlation
to generate GAF. The GAF is represented as:
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G =

cos(φ1,1) cos(φ1,2) . . . cos(φ1,n)
cos(φ2,1) cos(φ2,2) . . . cos(φ2,n)
... . . .
...
...
cos(φn,1) cos(φn,2) . . . cos(φn,n)

(5.3)





(1−y2), which is the definition of GSF. The GSF mainly has an essential
property, and is reason why it is used in this research. The property of GSF is that, it preserves
the temporal dependency between MIOC parameters and forensic memory acquisition. This
is because GSF is bijective when 0 ≤ φ ≤ π , which means GSF can be transformed back to
the normalized time series (Tsai et al., 2019). It is this temporal dependency property of GSF
this study takes advantage of to support the prediction made in 3.3.3.






















(b) Polar Chart (c) GSF
Fig. 5.1 DNA pattern from timeseries
A timeseries can be reconstructed approximately with the help of the main diagonal
element Gi,i when k = 0 from the high level features learned by the deep neural network. The
only disadvantage is that the dimensions of GAF increases as the size of the gramian matrix
is n×n when the length of the raw time series is n. To address this issue the timeseries is
smoothed with the application of piecewise aggregation approximation whilst preserving its
trends (Wang and Oates, 2015). The process of generating DNA pattern from timeseries is
shown in figure 5.1.
106 Detecting Forensic Memory Acquisition Patterns using Convolution Neural Network
Once the DNA patterns have been generated, it can be analyzed using convolution neural
network to automatically extract features to distinguish between forensic memory acqui-
sition or non-acquisition. In which case the binary classification strategy is adopted. If a
forensic software tool has to be classified when memory acquisition takes place then the
multiclassification strategy will be used.
5.3 Convolution Neural Network
CNN is a deep neural network mostly applied to analyze visual images (Tsai et al., 2019),
and it employs a specialized linear operation known as convolution in its neural network.
CNN consists of an input layer, multiple hidden layers, and an output layer. These layers are
described in the following subsections.
5.3.1 Input Layer
The input layer takes a three-dimensional (3D) input of the form (rows × cols × channels). If
the input layer is receiving a colour image, then the depth or channel would be 3, because the
3 channels would contain red, green, and blue colours as shown in figure 5.2. Each channel
in turn consists of 4 rows and 4 columns; therefore, the input size would be (4×4 ×3). If the
number of channels is 1 in case of grayscale images, in which case the input size would be



















Fig. 5.2 Three-Channel (R,G,B) input layer
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5.3.2 Hidden Layers
The hidden layers which consist of convolution layers, pooling layers and fully connected
layers. These layers are described below:
Convolution Layer
The convolution layer uses the mathematical principle of convolution. Since, the image is
a two-dimensional (2D) signal, 2D convolution will be applied. The 2D convolution with
image (I) and kernel (K)is expressed by equation 5.4 (Goodfellow et al., 2016, Pg 328):
(I ∗K)(i, j) = ∑
m,n
K(m,n)I(i+n, j+m) (5.4)
The 2D convolution drags a kernel or filter over the image. The dragging starts at the
origin of the image and ends at the point where the pixels end for the image. The kernel shifts
over the image by specific number of pixels called the stride ’s’. At times, zero-padding ’p’
is added around the image which controls the size of the output. If the size of the input image
is Wi ×Hi ×Ci where Wi, Hi, and Ci are width, height, and number of channels of the image
respectively. Now, when we apply Co filters or kernels with size k× k on the image, then the









Co is 3 for colour images and 1 for grayscale images. Generally, for images with Ci
channels, the shape of the kernel is (k,k,Ci,Co). The number of parameters for a kernel
will be (k× k×Ci +1)×Co. The CNN is mostly used with an activation function known as
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU), and the output of the CNN layer is activation maps or feature
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maps. The next layer, pooling layer, in the CNN will process these activation maps (Li,
2018).
For example, consider the red channel and its respective kernel or filter with stride 1 in figure
5.3. The convolution of the image and kernel gives rise to a feature map. The first element in
the feature map is calculated by using equation 5.4 as follows: (9×1)+(14×−1)+(6×












Fig. 5.3 Convolution Layer
Pooling Layer
The pooling layers reduces the dimensions of the feature maps from the convolution layers.
This process is also known as sub-sampling. The dimensions are downsampled either by
taking the maximum or average on patches of the image which is known as max-pooling
and mean-pooling respectively. If we consider 3×3 patches over which maximum value is
take to define the output layer and if the stride is 3, then the width and height of the image is
















Fig. 5.4 Max-Pooling Operation
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The left-hand side image in figure 5.4 is the feature map, and it is divided into four
partitions, which is represented by blue, pink, yellow, and green colours respectively. Then,
the max-pooling operation is applied with stride 3. During max-pooling, only the maximum
value from each partition is selected to form another feature map, which is of the size 2×2
as shown in the right-hand side image of figure 5.4.
Fully Connected Layer
The role of the convolution and pooling layers is to detect high level features in an image.
Once these features are detected, it is inputted to the fully connected (FC) layer as shown in
figure . The FC layer takes an input volume from the output of convolution, ReLU or pooling
layer. It then outputs a N dimensional vector, where N is the number of classes. For example,
in a multiclassification problem with 5 classes, if the softmax approach is used, then the
output of the FC layer would be in a probability vector form such as [0,0.1,0.35,0.98,0.15],
which indicates probability of each class. In this example, class 3 has the highest probability



















   Convolution
        and
Pooling Layers
Fig. 5.5 Fully-Connected Layer
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5.4 3 Layered Convolution Neural Network
In this research, the 3 Layered Convolution Neural Network (3L-CNN) has been used
(Collet, 2016). Firstly, the reason for using this approach is, 3L-CNN is suited for small to
medium-sized datasets which consists of few hundreds to thousands of images. The training
dataset consists of 14000 images and the test dataset consists of 3500, which is considered
as medium-sized dataset. Therefore, the main priority is to minimize overfitting because
training the model with a lot of layers could lead to overfitting. To minimize overfitting, the
entropic capacity, which is the amount of information a model can store. The number of
layers in the model, higher the entropic capacity. Therefore, the 3 layers of CNN can be seen
in listing 5.2.
Listing 5.1 3-Layers of CNN to Minimize Overfitting
model = S e q u e n t i a l ( )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 3 2 , ( 3 , 3 ) , i n p u t _ s h a p e = i n p u t _ s h a p e ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e = (2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 3 2 , ( 3 , 3 ) ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e = (2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 6 4 , ( 3 , 3 ) ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e = (2 , 2 ) ) )
If a model has a small dataset and high entropic capacity, this would lead to overfitting
as the model will end up learning features from the noise and fail to generalize patterns on
data that it has not seen previously. Whereas, a model with less entropic capacity will lead to
the model learning less features from the data and will underfit the data, (Kalliatakis et al.,
2019).
Secondly, data augmentation and dropout layers will help reduce overfitting. Data augmenta-
tion subjects the data to number of random transformations, so that a model would never see
the same picture twice. This prevents overfitting and helps the model to generalize better.
Dropout also minimizes overfitting by preventing a layer from seeing the same pattern again,
thus acting in a way analogous to data augmentation. Both dropout and data augmentation
tend to disrupt random correlations occurring in the data, (Appalaraju and Chaoji, 2017). In
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listing 5.2, the final dense layer has 7 outputs this is because the dataset consists of 7 classes,
and softmax layer is used in the final activation since this is a multi-classification task.
Listing 5.2 3L-CNN Dropout Layer
model . add ( F l a t t e n ( ) )
model . add ( Dense ( 6 4 ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( Dropout ( 0 . 5 ) )
model . add ( Dense ( 7 ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ so f tmax ’ ) )
Another issue with the model training on a particular dataset is the selection of number
of epochs and batchsize. There does not appear to be a standard practice in determining the
number of epochs and batchsize. Broadly, there are two methods to select those parameters
depending on the resources available. On general processing units (GPUs) hyper-parameters
tuning technique is used to determine the values of epochs and batchsize Chen et al. (2016).
Whereas on lower resource intensive machines running on central processing unit (CPU),
a hit-and-trial method is used to determine the size of epoch and batch-size Vinayakumar
et al. (2017). In this research, the latter approach is chosen because it adheres to the research
methodology adopted in 3.3.
5.5 Analysis of 3L-CNN Results
The results of 3L-CNN consist of binary classification and multiclassification of memory, I/O,
and CPU parameters. The multiclassification for 3L-CNN consists of 7 classes, and its results
are analyzed in section . The model is trained using three datasets consisting of memory,
I/O, and CPU parameters. Each dataset is further divided into train and validation dataset.
The train and validation (test) dataset consists of 14000 and 3500 images for each class
respectively. Firstly, the multiclassification results will be analyzed and then compared to the
results of binary classification. The results of multiclassification are obtained from training
and validating the datasets consisting of memory, I/O, and CPU parameters. The results from
each category will be analyzed by comparing training and validation accuracies, loss, recall,
and precision. As seen in section 5.4 certain measures such as dropout and augmentation
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were taken to avoid overfitting, and by analyzing the results it can be concluded whether the
model has overfit, underfit, or is a good fit to the data. IN this research, since the training
set consists of 14000 samples, a batchsize of 20 and 50 epochs was chosen, which means
the dataset is divided into 700 samples consisting of 20 batches, and each epoch contains 20
batches.
5.5.1 3L-CNN Multiclassification Analysis of Memory parameters
Firstly, the graphs of training and validation accuracy, and loss, will be analyzed to determine
whether the model has overfit or underfit the data. Then, training validation and precision
graphs will also be analyzed to determine how well the model has trained and validated the
data.
The model has been run for 50 epochs. As seen in figure 5.6, the blue and orange curve are
train and validation (test) accuracy curves respectively.
Fig. 5.6 Accuracy, Loss and Precision Curves for 3L-CNN Memory Parameters
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Between epoch 1 to 6, the model underfits memory parameters as the train accuracy
is less than the validation accuracy. As the number of epochs increases the train accuracy
increases and the validation accuracy almost stays constant at about 0.85. This means the
model has slightly overfit the data. Also the green and the red curves which are the training
and validation loss curves respectively indicate the model has slightly overfit the data after
nine epochs as the validation loss is greater than the training loss. When the recall of train
and validation set are compared, it is seen that the recall for 3L-CNN the training curve,
indicated by the grey line, fluctuates with extreme values until about eight epochs, and also
decreases at the eighteenth epoch as shown in 5.7.
Fig. 5.7 Recall Curves for 3L-CNN Memory Parameters
Whereas, even though the recall of validation curve which is indicated by pink line has
lesser values than the training curve, it is almost closer to it and it is in the higher nineties.
This means the recall for both training and validation is high, which further is a sign that this
model identifies almost all of the classes in the training and the validation set. But, when
the precision of training and validation curves, which is shown in violet and brown curves
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respectively in figure 5.6. The precision for training set varies between fifty to about seventy
percent, and is fifty percent for the validation set. This means for all the patterns identified by
the model, only fifty percent of them are being detected. This may be due to overfitting the
data in which 3L-CNN identifies patterns of augmentation and noise as well apart from the
patterns from the images. The results indicate this model fails to generalize DNA patterns
when detecting them from validation set.
5.5.2 3L-CNN Multiclassification Analysis of I/O Parameters
The graphs of training and validation accuracy and loss will be compared to determine if the
model is a good fit to data, or whether it has overfit or underfit the data. As seen in figurea
5.8 and 5.9, the training and validation curves are overlapping.
Fig. 5.8 Accuracy for 3L-CNN IO Parameters
Also, the training and validation loss curves show that the data underfits I/O parameters
up to twelve epochs. But as 3L-CNN has been augmented and dropout layers added to
minimize overfitting, after about twelve epochs this model handles overfitting, and hence
fits data well. Also, the results of recall and precision for both training and validation sets
are 1 and 0.99 respectively, which means this model identifies all images from both training
and validation sets. Out of those all images that have been identified, 3L-CNN detects DNA
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Fig. 5.9 Loss Curves for 3L-CNN IO Parameters
patterns about 99 percent of the time. Therefore, 3L-CNN fits the I/O parameters as it does
not suffer from overfitting or underfitting. Hence, this model performs well in detecting DNA
patterns from I/O parameters.
5.5.3 3L-CNN Multiclassification Analysis of CPU Parameters
Figure 5.10 shows the results of accuracy and loss for train and validation datasets. From
figure 5.10a it is seen that the train curve is above or higher than that of the validation curve,
but it does not give a clear picture whether this model has overfit the data as the two curves
are closer to each other.
Whereas, when compared to figure 5.10b, there is a slight undefit of data until about
two epochs, which is understandable as the model has still not seen all of the data from the
training set. As the number of epochs gradually increases, it is seen that from eighth epoch
onwards the validation curve decreases, and the training-validation curves diverge from each
other. Also from figure 5.10b, it is clearly seen that the validation loss curve is greater than
that of the training loss curve, which means the model has overfit the data. When the model’s
recall is taken into account, it can be seen that in figure 5.11a, the recall for training set is
less than fifty percent and approximately fifty percent for the validation dataset.
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(a) Train and Validation Accuracy Curves (b) Train and Validation Loss Curves
Fig. 5.10 Accuracy and Loss Curves for CPU parameters
(a) Train and Validation Recall Curves (b) Train and Validation Precision Curves
Fig. 5.11 Recall and Precision Curves for CPU parameters
This means for CPU parameters, the 3L-CNN model only identifies less than or equal to
fifty percent of the images in either of the datasets. Out of fifty percent images identified,
sixty-five to seventy percent of the time the model makes the right detection as the precision
varies between that range as shown in figure 5.11b which corroborates with figure 5.10 .
Therefore, from figure 5.10b, the model does not perform well in detecting DNA patterns
from CPU parameters.
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5.6 Binary Classification Analysis of 3L-CNN
Binary classification was performed to improve the detection performance. As the number of
classes has been reduced from seven to two, the results shown an improvement of perfor-
mance over the multiclassification approach. Especially for, memory parameters and CPU
parameters. Also, in addition to train and validation accuracy, loss, recall, and precision
curves even the number of false positives (FPs) and false negatives (FNs) are also analyzed
for binary classification. As FPs and FNs further support the cases where the model has
overfit, underfit, or fits the data well.
Binary classification Analysis of Memory Parameters
As seen in figure 5.12a, the train and validation accuracy curves pattern shown that the
training accuracy is greater than validation accuracy up to 29 epochs. From epoch 30
onwards, the model tries to overcome or minimize the affects of overfitting. This is due to
the fact that 3L-CNN has been designed to overcome overfitting by adding dropout layers
and by augmenting the images. The affect of overfitting is also seen in figure 5.12b. The
validation curve is greater than that of the training curve. The overfitting occurs at about the
27th and 29th epoch. From epoch 30 onwards the model tackles the overfitting issue.
Also, the average training recall rate for this model using memory parameters is 75
percent . Therefore, from the accuracy and loss curves shown in figure 5.13 and the recall
and precision curves in figure , it is concluded that this model overfits the data. This means
the model fails to generalize the DNA patterns by only learning noise patterns also within its
training dataset. This is the reason the model has higher number of type II errors or false
negatives. Hence, this model does not perform well using memory parameters.
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(a) Train and Validation Accuracy Curves (b) Train and Validation Loss Curves
Fig. 5.12 Memory Accuracy and Loss Curves for Binary Classification
(a) Train and Validation Precision Curves (b) Train and Validation Recall Curves
Fig. 5.13 Memory Precision and Recall Curves for Binary Classification
Binary Classification of I/O Parameters
From the accuracy and loss curves as shown in figure 5.14 it appears the model is a good fit to
the data but only up to certain epochs. The training accuracy curve of training set fluctuates
around the validation set up to 38 epochs as seen in figure 5.14a, and then both training
accuracy increases whilst the validation accuracy remains constant. As the accuracy train
curve is greater than the validation curve after epoch 38, this means the model has overfit
the data. Likewise, even the training and validation loss curves as seen in figure 5.14b show
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that after epoch 38, the training loss decreases and the validation loss continues to remain
constant, which is also an indication that the model is overfitting the data. Therefore, it would
be recommended to stop training this model at epoch 37 since the model fits the data well
until that epoch.
(a) Train and Validation Accuracy Curves (b) Train and Validation Loss Curves
Fig. 5.14 I/O Accuracy and Loss Curves for Binary Classification
Also, this model has hundred percent recall for both validation and train datasets, this
means it is able to detect all the images in those datasets. Out of all the images detected, about
99.8 of them have their DNA patterns correctly identified. The reason for such excellent
recall and precision rates is the fewer number of type I and type II errors which are four and
zero respectively. This in turn means that this model works best for identifying DNA patterns
in I/O parameters to detect forensic memory acquisition.
Binary Acquisition using CPU Parameters
The model’s accuracy and loss curves in figure 5.15 show that the model is a good fit to
the data. Although, there is a presence of a steep spike at about epoch twenty during which
underfitting occurs as the training accuracy is lesser than validation accuracy, and validation
loss is less than training loss. After epoch twenty, the model again fits the data well until the
last epoch. The overall validation recall and precision for this model using CPU parameters
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(a) Train and Validation Accuracy Curves (b) Train and Validation Loss Curves
Fig. 5.15 CPU Accuracy and Loss Curves for Binary Classification
is 98.2 and 95.57 percent. This means the model is able to identify 98.2 percent of the images
in the validation dataset, and out of all the identified images the model is able to identify
95.57 percent of them correctly. Also, the reason for the spike occurring at epoch twenty
for accuracy, loss, recall, and precision curves is that this model has the maximum number
of false positives and false negatives during epoch twenty. After epoch twenty, the model
overcomes and minimizes underfitting. Overall, this model performance is satisfactory when
detecting forensic memory acquisition CPU parameters.
5.7 Results and Analysis of Integrated Parameters
In this section, the integrated dataset, that is, the memory, I/O, CPU (MIOC) parameters
are combined into a single dataset. Then, the GAF transformation was applied to convert
the MIOC dataset to images and trained using the 3L-CNN model. The datasets were
multiclassified and binary classified. Multiclassification and binary classification, in essence,
have the same goal, that is, to predict memory acquisition or memory non-acquisition.
The difference is that multiclassification predicts not only memory acquisition or non-
memory acquisition, it also classifies which forensic acquisition tool is acquiring memory
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or not acquiring memory. Or, which non-forensic tool is not acquiring memory. But, the
shortcoming here is that it can be difficult to maintain a higher recall and precision with
fewer type I and type II errors. To, address this shortcoming, binary classification on MIOC
dataset was performed, which shows slight improvement over the multiclassification strategy.
The following sections discusses about multiclassification and binary classification analysis
of integrated MIOC parameters.
5.7.1 Multiclassification Analysis of Integrated MIOC Parameters
The models accuracy curve shows that the validation accuracy curve is greater than that of
the training accuracy curve which indicates that the model has underfit the data, but on close
observation we can see that the curves are closer to each other without a big difference in
values. Also, from epoch number 35, the validation and loss curves tend to be much closer
to each other indicating the model is a good fit to the data. Similarly, the validation loss
(a) Train and Validation Accuracy Curves (b) Train and Validation Loss Curves
Fig. 5.16 Accuracy and Loss Curves for MIOC Multiclassification
curve is lesser than that of the training loss curve which indicates the model has underfit the
data. At about epoch number 15, it can be seen that the model tries to overcome underfitting,
but continues to underfit until epoch 35, after which the training and validation loss curves
get very closer to each other indicating the model is a good fit to the data. Also, the overall
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accuracy, precision and recall are around 99 percent in both training and validation datasets,
which indicates the model generalizes the data well, and detects DNA patterns from combined
MIOC parameters.
5.7.2 Binary Classification Analysis of Integrated MIOC Parameters
When the training and validation accuracy curves are first looked at 5.17, it gives the
impression that the model has overfit the data because the training curve is greater than
validation curve. But, with a closer observation, the graph in figure 5.17a indicates the
difference between training and validation curve is just 0.001, which is not very high.
Therefore, it can be argued that the model has fit the data well since the difference between
training and validation accuracy curve is very low. Similarly, the training and validation loss
(a) Train and Validation Accuracy Curves (b) Train and Validation Loss Curves
Fig. 5.17 Accuracy and Loss Curves for MIOC Binary Classification
curves at first glance indicate that the model is overfitting the data. Having a closer look at
the graph in figure 5.17b, it can be seen that the difference between training and validation
loss curves is approximately 0.02, which is not a very high difference. Therefore, it can be
argued that the model fits the data well since the difference between training and validation
loss curves is very low. Also, this model has very high precision and recall which is around
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99 percent, and few type I errors. Hence, this model generalizes data well, and detects DNA
patterns from combined MIOC parameters.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a method to detect memory acquisition patterns was proposed. First, the
dataset was transformed to images using the mathematical concept of Gramian Angular
Fields. Then a 3-Layered convolution neural network was used to detect the DNA patterns.
After analyzing the results, it was found that whilst analyzing the multiclassification of the
parameters individually, memory parameters overfits the data whilst CPU parameters underfit
the data, and therefore they are not recommended to detected memory acquisition patterns.
Whilst I/O parameters is recommended as its fits the data well.
As for individual binary classification is concerned, the memory parameters is again not
recommended as the model overfits the data. Whereas, the I/O parameters fit the data well
but up to epoch 37. Therefore, it is recommended to stop this model at that epoch for the
model to detect memory acquisition patterns accurately. The CPU parameters performance
is satisfactory as it can detect about 98.2 percent patterns and out of it can correctly identify
about 95.57 percent patterns that have been detected.
After analyzing the results individually using multiclassification and binary classification,
the parameters were combined into a single dataset (MIOC) and later analyzed using the
aforementioned classification techniques. The analysis of the muliticlassification and binary
MIOC parameters shows that the model generalizes data well, and it has high precision and
recall rates and fewer type I and type II errors. Hence, this shows that by combining the
parameters the issues of overfitting and underfitting have been addressed to a larger extent
when compared to using the model to detect memory acquisition patterns individually.

Chapter 6
A Formalism to Validate Digital Forensic
Models
6.1 Introduction
The effectiveness of DNA fingerprinting technique, over signature based detection in 2.4 and
various anti-forensic techniques in 2.3 has been demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
The DNA fingerprinting technique is proposed as an anti-forensic method as it can be used to
defeat the live forensic acquisition process. The research problem identified in 2.3 gave rise
to research question 2 (RQ2): How can digital forensic models be validated when they are
affected by anti-forensic techniques? This research question is answered in this chapter by
meeting its corresponding research objective (RO6): Formalize a generic principle to validate
digital forensic models by counteracting anti-forensic techniques.
Given the numerous amount of DFMs proposed in the literature, and the fact that DFMs
are being enhanced by either adding or deleting a phase from the preceding models as
seen in 2.1, thus making DFMs redudant. Therefore, to meet RO6, this research proposed
validation principle by using mathematical formalism (Weir, 2019) to validate DFMs, instead
of developing a digital forensic model or framework.
This chapter commences with the reiteration of the anti-forensic techniques that affect major
phases of the forensic process, and then provides a level of abstraction for validation. After
126 A Formalism to Validate Digital Forensic Models
the need for DFM validation is justfied, DFMs are validated by proving various propositions
and theorems, which leads into the validation principle.
6.2 Anti-Forensic Methods Affecting DF Phases
In this section the anti-forensic methods are reviewed to find which anti-forensic methods
affect which phases in the digital forensic process. The focus is on the four most common
phases in the digital forensic process: Acquisition, Examination, Analysis, and Reporting.
Acquisition
When the investigator decides to acquire evidence off a machine they would follow certain
procedures depending on the state of the machine i.e., whether it is ON (live acquisition) or
the OFF state (dead acquisition). There are anti-forensic techniques that could defeat either of
the acquisition procedures. For example, during the acquisition of memory if the drivers used
in a forensic tool is dependent on the ’KDBG’ string to resolve symbols, then this method
could interrupt the memory acquisition process (Haruyama and Suzuki, 2012). Also, if the
undocumented memory enumeration application peripheral interface (API) and memory
mapping API such as MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges and MmMapMemoryDumpMdl are
patched to return a NULL value then this would return a modified version of the memory
map thus resulting in incomplete acquisition of the memory as argued by Stüttgen and Cohen
(2013). Malware researchers and investigators employ API call hooking techniques to study
and know the behaviour of malware, but Shaid and Maarof (2015) found that this method
could be prove to be futile as a malware can detect API calls and then evidence could be
manipulated. Another approach undertaken by Zhang et al. (2018) is by implementing
an anti-forensic technique known as Hidden in I/O Space (HIveS) and malicious enclave
software to tamper with the acquisition process to prevent memory analysis. This technique
is designed to operate outside the scope of the operating system and therefore making it
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harder to detect its presence in the memory. Even hard drive acquisition can be defeated if
the attacker adopts techniques such as anti-forensics of data storage by alternative use of
communication channels (AFAUC) (Baier and Knauer, 2014). In AFAUC, the storage device
is accessed through its diagnostic interface to hide or even obfuscate data such that it will not
be accessible to the investigator. Moreover, this hidden data will also be absent in hidden
areas such as host protected area and device configuration overlay of the hard drive which the
investigator might look into before making a forensic image of the device. Hence, defeating
the forensic acquisition process.
Examination
This phase of the forensic process can be mainly defeated by encrypting the whole storage
media or just certain partitions within the storage media. Or, even applying steganography
techniques such as hiding a file system within a file system which can be accomplished by
the encryption tool TrueCrypt. This is a useful technique for an attacker because they can
disclose the encryption key or passphrase for the first encrypted file system, but not for the
other hidden filesystem which could result in the investigators being unaware of the hidden
filesystem. Due to this clever technique the suspects in the UK would be able to comply
with section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000), but they
would be able to avoid punishment mentioned in section 53 of the RIPA, thus deceiving the
investigation and the legislation used to tackle encryption key issues. Other ways of hiding a
file to prevent examination as mentioned by Dahbur and Mohammad (2011) is to manipulate
certain registry key, hiding data in the HPA and DCO areas of the hard drive, or even using
bootable USBs or DVDs, and compression bombs such as 42.zip.
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Analysis
During the analysis phase the investigation certain files or areas of the storage device will be
looked into to find relevant information pertaining to the case. This process can be defeated
or prolonged depending on the anti-forensic technique. A kernel rootkit disk filter driver
known as ‘Ddefy.sys’ can be used to hide a file from a New Technology File System (NTFS)
filesystem. The driver can locate the filename, its directory entry position, the clusters
containing data, and its disk position and with this information the data can be hidden. The
same rootkit can also defeat memory analysis by performing a system service dispatch table
(SSDT) hook which can be used to modify a process and thread list Bilby (2006). Also,
encryption of certain files with strong passphrases will consume lot of the investigation
time, steganography techniques of hiding a file within a file may cause the investigator to
overlook certain important files. Tools such as metasploit’s slacker which can be used to
delete data in the slack space which would make it impossible to recover deleted data, and
metasploit’s transmogrify can be used to change metadata such as modified, accessed, created
parameters of a file thus defeating timeline analysis as argued by Garfinkel (2006), Dahbur
and Mohammad (2011), and Gül and Kugu (2017).
Reporting
It is possible to inject malicious code into computer forensic tools (CFTs) to produce false
forensic reports and also infect the computer. This kind of attack can be done by adopting
hypertext markup language (HTML) code injection technique wherein a malware can be
embedded into a report that can be used to attack web browsers. Now, when the report
is viewed in to web browser the malware escapes the virtual environment and infects the
machine which was demonstrated by Wundram et al. (2013).
After reviewing various anti-forensic techniques,the findings show that various phases in
the digital forensic process are subjected to anti-forensic attacks as shown in Table 6.1.
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Collection Examination Analysis Reporting
AFAUC Data Hiding Steganography Code Injec-
tion
Kernel Debugger Block Hid-
ing






Encryption Adding known files
Data Pooling Data manipulation String decoration
AFAUC False Audit Trails
Compression Bombs Hash Collisions





Table 6.1 AF techniques affecting various digital forensic phases
6.3 Abstracted Digital Forensic Framework
In the literature of digital forensics (DF) numerous digital forensic models were reviewed
in section 2.1. One of the important aspects of DF research is tool testing. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) oversees this aspect of DF research and various
DF tools are tested and then reported on their website National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Then there is FSR-G-218 method validation in digital forensics in the United
Kingdom (UK) and Daubert Standard in the United States (US) to validate digital forensic
methods and procedures. In this research it is argued that DFMs, DF tool testing, DF Method
validation, and the concerned legislation are inter-related and have their layer of abstraction.
An abstracted framework is proposed that shows the inter-relationship among the first three
layers and their relationship to the fourth layer. The four layers of abstraction are described
below:





Fig. 6.1 Levels of Abstraction for Testing Digital Forensic Models/Frameworks
6.3.1 DFM Validation
The first layer is the DFM. The investigation of digital crime is a step-by-step process. This
process can be guided by a standard operating procedure (SOP) or a DFM as to how to go
by collecting, preserving, analysing and reporting digital evidence. Now, the procedure to
collect digital evidence will be guided by a method. For example, during the collection
phase if a computer is the ON state then specific procedures will be followed to gather
relevant evidence Williams (2012). And when gathering digital evidence off a computer,
this will entail a forensic software tool. During this process of collecting evidence, care will
be taken to maintain the integrity of the evidence and this is done so as to conform to the
legislation. Now, to maintain evidence integrity the method and the forensic tools used have
to be validated. Method validation and tool validation are discussed below.
6.3.2 Tool Validation
Ensuring reliability of digital forensic tools is of prime importance to the forensic community.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States (US) set up
the Computer Forensic Tool Testing Program (CFTT) for this purpose National Institute of
Standards and Technology. The CFTT projects evaluates digital forensic tools by adopting
functional conformance testing i.e., a set of requirements are established by developing a set
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of test assertions and cases. And set of setting procedures are used to perform tests. Over
the years numerous digital forensic tools have been tested and documented on their project
website. As of October 2017 onwards in the UK, the FSR in its code of practice made it
mandatory that all providers of digital forensic services to the criminal justice system must
be accredited to ISO-17025, which provides general requirements for the competence of
testing and calibration laboratories.
6.3.3 Method Validation
In the US a method or procedure adopted by a investigator has to be adhered to the Daubert
Standard, which provides a set of objective guidelines for judges to determine the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence in the courts. The Daubert standard applies to those digital forensic
methods or procedures that were used to uncover evidence from digital devices, and must
satisfy the following criteria Meyers and Rogers (2005)
1. "Testing: Can and has the scientific procedure been independently tested? Peer Review:
Has the scientific procedure been published and subject to peer review?"
2. "Error rate: Is there a known error rate, or potential to know the error rate, associated
with the use of this scientific procedure?
3. Standards: Are there standards and protocols for the execution of the methodology?"
4. "Acceptance: Is the scientific procedure generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community?"
In the United Kingdom (UK), in 2005 the House of Commons Science Technology
Committee (2019) in the paragraph 173 mentioned that validation of scientific methods are
absent before they are admitted in the court, and judges are incompetent to determine the
validity of scientific evidence and they recommended Forensic Science Advisory Council
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which belongs to Forensic Science Regulator. (2019) to develop a test for scientific evidence
which should build on the Daubert Test. In 2016, the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR)
has produced a guidance on method validation in digital forensics FSR-G-218 as seen on
Forensic Science Regulator (2016). It amalgamates essential information from International
Standards Organisation (2017), FSR-G-201 validation guidance found in Forensic Science
Regulator (2014), Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (2019), and Criminal
Practice Directions as mentioned in Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (2014).
6.3.4 Legislation Conformation
If the investigator’s methods, procedures, tools, process are validated, then the chances of the
evidence being accepted in the court increases. For example, if the investigation method fits
or satisfies the criteria and objectives of the daubert standard then it would be accepted or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 702 and 902 (Upcounsel, 2019). In
the abstraction layers the digital forensic tools and methods can be validated, but a procedure
to validate DFMs is not present in the literature. In the next section, why validating DFMs is
important is justified, and in section 6.5 a principle to validate DFMs is proposed.
6.4 Justifying the Validation of DFMs
In section 6.1.2 of FSR-G-218 it is mentioned that risk assessment must be conducted before
performing validation testing. Risk assessment in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) usually
includes: "a. the risk of wrongful conviction(s); b. the risk of wrongful acquittal(s); and c.
the risk of obstructing or delaying investigation(s)."
The aforementioned three circumstances can occur if one is not aware of the anti-forensic
methodologies and techniques as pointed out by Dahbur and Mohammad (2011), and
Garfinkel (2006). Apart from this, if the anti-forensic techniques/methodologies as shown in
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Table 6.1 is not taken into consideration into the risk assessement procedures of FSR-G-218
or any guidance document that depends on it, then this can pose a threat to the investigation
as far as reliability of evidence is concerned which is specifically mentioned in the direction
19A.6 of the Criminal Practice Directions.
Previously, according to section 69 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (The
National Archives, 2019), it was mandatory to prove that the computer was functioning
properly, and was not wrongly used to produce a document that could be admitted as evidence.
This rule has been repealed by section 60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999
(The National Archives., 2019). And now, the computer evidence adheres to the common
law rule that a presumption exists that the computer producing evidence was functioning
properly at the time of investigation. Therefore, the evidence is admissible in the court of law.
However, this presumption can be rebutted if either of the parties (prosecution or defense)
adduce evidence to the contrary. Digital Forensic Investigators often use forensic software
tools to generate forensic reports. Wundram et al. (2013) demonstrated an anti-forensic
technique that attacks a forensic tool to generate false forensic reports. If either of the party
proves that the investigation was compromised, then according to rebuttable presumption the
evidence might be adjudged inadmissible in the court of law. Most of the digital forensic
models in section 2.1 or the FSR-G-218 guidance on method validation in digital forensics
do not address anti-forensic issues. This research addresses the aforementioned problems by
proposing a principle for validating DFMs.
6.5 Validating Digital Forensic Models
In this section, a principle for validating DFMs by counteracting anti-forensic techniques
that affects each phase in the digital forensic process is proposed. The logic behind this
principle is that for a DFM to be validated, every phase in the DFM must be validated before
proceeding to the next phase, and when all the phases are validated then it can be concluded
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Phase-1 Phase-2 Phase-3 Phase-n
Anti-Forensic Environment
Fig. 6.2 n-phase DFM in an AF environment
that a DFM is validated. For a DFM phase to be validated, the anti-forensic techniques
in each and every phase of the digital forensic process must be accounted for, i.e., the AF
techniques should be detected and countered. The process of detecting and countermeasuring
anti-forensic (AF) techniques in each phase of the digital forensic process is the essence of
the validation principle and is formalized using the concept of tensor products.
Consider a DFM with n phases in an anti-forensic environment as shown in Figure 6.2.
According to the validation principle, firstly individual phases need to be validated
in their own AF environment. Now consider Phase 1 in Figure 6.2 in its anti-forensic
environment. Its AF environment is defined by its respective AF techniques, for example
those shown in Table 6.1. The first and the foremost step is to detect if an anti-forensic
technique or method is acting upon or affecting a phase in the digital forensic process or not.
To mathematically express this process certain definitions and axioms are first proposed, and
then propositions are proved with the help of these definitions and axioms. Mathematical
notations are presented in table 6.2.
Let the anti-forensic methods or techniques (A) acting upon a DF phase be represented by
the vector A = {a1,a2,a3, . . . ,an} such that ai ∈ A, and the detection methods be represented
as D = {d1,d2,d3, . . . ,dn} such that di ∈ D.




















Fig. 6.3 DF Phase Validation
Definition 6.5.1 The logical detector product (DM) is defined as {a j.d j ∈ DM|DM = a j ∧
d jT}, which means an anti-forensic technique (a j ∈ A) can be detected in ’n’ unique number
of ways using elements in D. This is analogous to inputting the individual vectors a and d to
logical and-gates.
Definition 6.5.2 The counter tensor product (CM) is defined as {e j.c j ∈CM|CM = e j.c jT}.
The significance of DM and CM as shown in Figure 6.3 is that it shows us if an anti-forensic
technique is detected or countered i.e., if the logical and of a j.d j = 1 then a j is detected.
Likewise, a j is countered if e j.c j = 1.
The relevance of DF phase validation in the context of forensic investigation is that, it
ensures a particular phase in the DFM is under the affect of an AF attack or not. If the DF
phase is being influenced by an AF tool or procedure, then the DF validation procedure could
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detect such an attack and counter it. And, if a phase is free of AF attacks, then this decreases
the chance of making wrong conclusions during the course of an investigation.
6.5.1 Vector Transformation Operators
The vector transformation operators play an important role in transforming DM and CM. If mi j
∈ Rp×q is a Matrix M, then Θnr,k(Mp×q) 7−→ Np×1, which means Θ
n
r,k on Mp×q yields ni j ∈
Rp×1 matrix N a column vector of order p×1. Here, the subscript r means the transformation
is only being applied to all the rows in M, and ’k’ and ’n’ means the transformation is from
row ’k’ to row ’n’. If only a specific row ’i’ is considered in M, then the row vector
transformation on row j in M is defined as logical-or of all elements in row j, i.e., Θr,i(Ri) =
Vni=1(ri), and this operation yields a singleton set by transforming the row vector Ri of order
1×q to a -matrix of order 1×1. Now, if the row vector transformation is applied to all rows in
M, beginning from the first row to the nth row, then Θnr,1 = {Θr,1(R1),Θr,2(R2), . . . ,Θr,n(Rn)},






i=1(ri) are logical & , and summation over each row in Matrix M respectively.
6.5.2 Formalization of DFM Validation
The notions of detecting AF attacks in DFM phases (Propositions 6.5.1 and 6.5.2) and
of validating DFMs (Theorem 6.5.1) are formalized in this section. Before moving onto
explaining the propositions, it is important to understand the function of the elements in
Figure 6.3, which is the diagrammatic representation of DFM phase validation. Now, if a
phase in a DFM is considered, say the first phase, then this phase must be accounted for
anti-forensic attacks. This is done with the help of the elements DM and CM. In order to
detect AF attacks, the AF detection mechanism may consist of numerous techniques or
methods to detect a single or numerous AF technique(s). These detection methods and AF
6.5 Validating Digital Forensic Models 137
techniques form a matrix (DM). And when certain operations are applied to DM, certain
results can be deduced from those operations, such as, when do AF techniques are said
to be detected, not detected, countered or not countered. This operation is mathematically
formalised and proved in proposition 6.5.1.
Proposition 6.5.1 (a) If in a DFM phase, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [k]1×1, k ∈ B, and if k=1 then
the AF techniques a ∈ A are detected, and if k=0, then A is undetected.
(b) If Ωc,1[Θnr,1(CM)] = [k]1×1 then the detected AF technique a ∈ A is countered if k=1, and
is not countered if k=0.
Proof: Consider any arbitrary DF phase, and if a ∈ A are the n anti-forensic vectors acting
upon the phase and if each vector in A can be detected by ’n’ number of ways, then the
detector tensor product of A and D is defined as DM = a j.dTi , where a j ∈ A, di ∈ D. Let’s
assume DM is a square matrix of order n× n consisting of ’n’ number of rows defined
by the set Rn = {R1,Rr, . . . ,Rn}, where any arbitrary row R jrow in Rn is defined as {R j
= a j.d1,a j.d2, . . . ,a j.dn}. If {∃a j.di ∈ R j|a j.di = 1} ∀Rn then a j is detected by di. Now,
if a row vector transformation is applied on DM, then it yields an all ones column vector
(E) of order n × 1 i.e., Θnr,1(DM)] = En×1. Therefore, the column transformation of E,
Ωc,1(E) = Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [1]1×1, therefore ∀a ∈ A is detected in a DFM phase. Now, if
{∃a j.di ∈ R j|a j.di = 0} ∀Rn then Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [0]1×1, and the DFM phase is still under
the effect of an anti-forensic attack. Proposition 1(a) is also known as the sufficiency principle.
After the anti-forensic technique a j is detected, it is passed to the counter product (CM) as
shown in Figure 6.3. The detected anti-forensic methods a j ∈ A in DM can be countered by
C={c1,c2,c3, . . . ,c j, . . . ,cn} in ’n’ number of ways, and thus the counter product is defined
as CM = (a j.d j).cTj = (e j).c
T
j = E.C
T . Now in CM if there exist at least one c j such that axiom
of counterability is satisfied then a j is countered by c j i.e., if {∃e j.ci ∈ R j|e j.ci = 1} ∀Rn
then a j is countered by ci, and if all the values on Rn are 0 then the anti-forensic technique is
not countered i.e., if {∀e j.ci ∈ R j|e j.ci = 0} ∀Rn then a j is not countered by ci.
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The purpose of DM and CM is not only to notify whether AF techniques are detected and
countered as proved in proposition 6.5.1, but also one can specifically pin-point as to which
detection method(s) has detected an AF attack(s). This is stated and proved in proposition
6.5.2.




gives the element di ∈ Ri that detects a j.
Proof: Since detector product DM is defined as {a j.d j ∈ DM|DM = a j.d jT} = {R j ∈ Rn|Rn =
a j.dn}. Therefore, DM is a set of rows R1 to Rn, that is, {R1,R2,R3, . . . ,Rn}. Now consider
any arbitrary row R j ∈ Rn defined as R j=a j.d1 + a j.d2 + a j.d3 + · · ·+ a j.dn. Now, if a j ∈














S̄0 S̄1 S̄2 . . . ¯SN−1 SN
S̄0 S̄1 S̄2 . . . SN−1 S̄N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S̄0 S1 S̄2 . . . ¯SN−1 S̄N
S1 S̄0 S̄2 . . . ¯SN−1 S̄N

Therefore, R j=a j(S̄0S̄1 . . .SN)+ · · ·+ a j(S0S̄1 . . . S̄N). This equation shows what di in R j
detects a j. For example, if R1=a j(S̄0S̄1 . . .SN), this means a1 is detected by d1 in row 1 (R1)
of DM.
Now. after proposition 6.5.1 is satisfied it is imperative to calculate the pass function
Pf , which indicates to the investigator whether the phase has been validated, and hence the
process can be proceeded to the next stage. Pf addresses the issue of assuming that it is
safe to proceed from one phase of the DFM without considering the effects of AF as seen in
the finding of the review in Section ??. And, when all phases have been validated, then the
validation principle is satisfied. The validation principle is stated in theorem 6.5.1.
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c(r,1)(M) Vector And−Or Transformation
Theorem 6.5.1 If (a) {∀Pi ∈ Pn|Pi = 1∨ r,1Φnc(r,1)(Pn) = 1} then the DFM is validated.
(b) {∃Pi ∈ Pn|Pi = 0∨ r,1Φnc(r,1)(Pn) = 0} then the DFM is invalidated.
Proof: By the definition of validation principle a DF phase is validated if all the anti-forensic
techniques of the respective phases in a DFM are detected and countered. Mathematically,
the validation principle is defined as
Pf j = [Ωc,1[Θnr,1(a j.di)]]. [Ωc,1[Θ
n
r,1((a j.di).ci)]] =
Ωc,1[Θnr,1(a j.di).((a j.di).ci)] = Ωc,1[Θ
n
r,1(a j.di).(e j.ci)] =
Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM).(CM)]⇒ Ωc,1[Θnr,1(Pi)].
Also, according to the validation principle if the phase function of the individual phases
Pi and i ∈ N in DFM is [1]1×1, then its respective phases are validated. Consider a DFM
with its respective phase functions as shown in Figure 6.4. Now, the individual phase
functions is Pn={P1,P2, . . . ,Pn} ⇒ {Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P1)], Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P2)],. . . , Ωc,1[Θnr,1(Pn)]}, which
is a row vector and represented as r,1Φnc(r,1) = Ωr,1[Ωc,1[Θ
n
r,1(Pi)]] and after the application of
proposition 6.5.1 (a) and (b) to r,1Φnc(r,1) if all phase functions in a digital forensic model is
[1]1x1 i.e., {∀Pi ∈ Pn|Pi = 1}, then r,1Φnc(r,1)(Pn) =1 and the DFM is validated. Else if at least
one of the elements in Pn or if at least one of phase functions in a digital forensic model is 0
i.e., {∃Pi ∈ Pn|Pi = 0}, then r,1Φnc(r,1)(Pn)=0 and the DFM is invalidated.
The forensic implication of DF phase functions, is that if even one of the phases is under
the influence of an AF attack, then the investigation must not be proceeded any further. This
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Phase-1 Phase-2 Phase-3 Phase-n
Pf1 Pf2 Pf3 Pfn
Fig. 6.4 DF Phase Functions
would enable the investigator indentify and rectify the AF threat. Therefore, avoiding any
cases that would defeat the purpose of digital forensic process. If and only if all the phases in
a DFM are not under the influence of an AF attack, only then the investigator could proceed
further with the investigation.
6.6 Evaluation
This section demonstrates the feasibility of the validation principle by evaluating three DFMs.
The first DFM is based on a hypothetical scenario to show a DFM that is successfully
validated, and the other two DFMs selected from the literature are Rekhis and Boudriga
(2012b) Rani and Kumari (2017), to prove how these DFMs fail validation using the validation
principle. All DFMs are evaluated based on the validation principle as mentioned in section
6.5. Firstly, a hypothetical situation is explained, and then the evaluation process of the DFM
phases is processed in four steps: 1) The AF column vector a and the detection row vector d
are determined. 2) The vector-or transformation Θ(DM) is computed to detect anti-forensic
techniques in a DF phase. 3) The vector-or transformation Θ(CM) is computed to counter
anti-forensic techniques in a DF Phase. 4) Then finally, the phase function Pf is computed.
And based on the value of Pf validate or invalidate a DFM.
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6.6.1 Validation Case
The application of this principle is shown by using a hypothetical situation where in a
defendant is accused of DDoS attacking an organisation’s network from their laptop, and the
defendant claims that they’re unaware of it and that their laptop might be hacked to perpetrate
the crime. Now, let us assume the investigator follows a SOP and applies the principle to test
for the validation of the DFM (before proceeding with the investigation and making a report
to the court) which comprises of 4 phases collection, examination, analysis, and reporting.
The objectives for each phase are as follows:
1. Collection: To collect or gather evidence from physical memory and hard drive.
2. Examination: To examine the content of the hard drive such as what is the size of the
hard drive, volumes, hidden files, file types etc.
3. Analysis: To answer questions pertaining to investigation or support the investigative
hypothesis/counter-hypothesis.
4. Report: To make a report of the findings.
To keep this case study simple, it is assumed that each phase in the DFM has two AF
techniques a1 and a2 (except for reporting phase), and a1 and a2 have only d1 and d2 as their
detecting methods and C1 and C2 as their countermeasures respectively.
Collection
During the collection phase the investigator uses a forensic tool to image the physical memory,
and since the principle is being used the AF techniques in the collection phase (a1 and a2)
will be looked up. Let us assume the AF techniques “Memory enumeration API hooking”
and “Memory Mapping API hooking” is acting up on the collection phase, and also assume
these two AF techniques can be detected and countered. The following four steps shows the
application of the principle to validate the collection phase:
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Step1: Determine column vectors a and d. The two AF techniques affecting the collection
phase are:
a1 = Memory enumeration API hooking
a2 = Memory Mapping API hooking, and
d1 = d2 = A forensic tool that can detect a1 and a2.





. Since, for a1 can be detected by d1, and a2 can be detected by d2.





Therefore, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [1]1×1
Step 3: Compute CM once the AF techniques a1 and a2 have been detected. Now, a1 and
a2 can be countered by, c1 = c2 = DumpIt, a memory acquisition tool resistant to a1 and









Therefore, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(CM)] = [1]1×1





⇒ Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P1)] = 1 the collection phase is validated since
proposition 6.5.1 is satisfied, and the investigator can proceed to the next phase, Examination.
Examination
The process of validating the examination phase is shown in the following four steps:
Step1: Determine column vectors a and d. The two AF techniques affecting the examination
phase are:
a1 = Encryption
a2 = Compression Bombs
d1 = Forensic Software (example EnCase 8)
d2 = Intelligent Decompression Libraries
Therefore, a1.d1 = 1 and a2.d2 =1, since a1 and a2 are detected by d1 and d2
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. Therefore, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [1]1×1
Step 3: Compute CM once the AF techniques a1 and a2 have been detected, that is, DM has
been determined. Let’s say a1 can be countered by c1 = Encryption Key, and c2 = 1, since
it has been detected in step 2 (see special case in section III). Therefore, ap1.c1 = logical










Step 4: Compute phase function (Pf ) once DM and CM for the examination phase are
determined. From steps 2 and 3, PfE xamination = [1 1] ⇒ Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P2)] = 1. Therefore, the
examination phase is validated since proposition 6.5.1 is satisfied, and the investigator can
proceed to the next phase, Analysis.
Analysis
Step1: The validation of analysis phase is shown in the following four phases:
Step1: Determine vectors a and d. The two AF techniques affecting the analysis phase are:
a1 = Hash Collisions
a2 = Loop References
d1 = linear probing
d2 = file name resolving error
Therefore, a1.d1 = 1 and a2.d2 =1, since a1 and a2 are detected by d1 and d2. Step 2: Compute









. Therefore, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [1]1×1.
Step 3: Compute CM once the AF techniques a1 and a2 have been detected, that is, DM
has been computed. By definition, CM = a∗CM. Now, a can be countered by c1 = c2 =
1, since it has been detected in step 2 (see special case in section). Therefore, ap1.c1 =













Step 4: Compute phase function (Pf ) once the values of DM and CM have been determined.
From steps 2 and 3„ PfAnalysis = [1 1] ⇒ Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P3)] = 1. Therefore, the analysis phase
is validated since proposition 6.5.1 is satisfied, and the investigator can proceed to the next
phase, Reporting.
Reporting
Step1: The process of validating the reporting phase is shown in the following four steps:
Step1: First determine vectors a and d. The AF technique is affecting this phase is a1 = Code
Injection
d11 = PsInfo Volatility Plugin
Therefore, a1.d1 = 1, since a1 is detected by d1.









Therefore, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(DM)] = [1]1×1
Step 3: Compute CM once the AF technique a1 is detected, that is, DM has been computed.
Now, a1 can be countered by c1 = execute the software with elevated privileges. Therefore,








. Therefore, Ωc,1[Θnr,1(CM)] =
[1]1×1
Step 4: Compute phase function (Pf ) once the values of DM and CM are determined. There-
fore, by definition, PfReporting = [1] ⇒ Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P4)] = 1. Therefore, the reporting phase is
validated, and the investigator can stop here as reporting is the final phase of the DFM.
And, now since all the individual phase functions in the respective phases are logical 1.
Mathematically, the Pf is an all ones unitary row vector i.e.,
Pf =
(
Pf collection Pf examination Pf analysis Pf reporting
)
. And since Pf =
(









The DFMs Rekhis and Boudriga (2012b) and Rani and Kumari (2017) which consists of five
and four phases respectively will also be evaluated because these are the two DFMs in the
literature that consider to detect anti-forensic techniques in the DF process. For the Rekhis
(Rekhis and Boudriga, 2012b) model, only the third phase function is Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P3)] = 1, and





r,1(P5)] = 0. This means the anti-forensic techniques are detected and
countered only in the third phase, but the other phases are affected by anti-forensic attacks
resulting in the overall phase function, r,1Φnc(r,1)(Pn) = 0. Therefore by theorem 6.5.1(b), the
model is invalid.
For the Rani’s model Rani and Kumari (2017), the third phase function is also Ωc,1[Θnr,1(P3)]
= 1 the anti-forensic attacks are detected only in phase 3, but not during the other phases as




r,1(P4)] = 0 leading to the
overall phase function ⇒ r,1Φnc(r,1)(Pn) = 0. Therefore, according to theorem 6.5.1 (b), the
model is invalid.
After evaluating the hypothetical model, and the other two models in the literature it has
been found that the hypothetical model is valid for investigation purposes because it satisfies
the validation principle. The other models only consider to detect anti-forensic attacks in
the analysis phase, and not in other phases of the models. Therefore, by validation principle
they are invalidated for investigation purposes.The advantage of this principle is, it just
takes only four steps to validate a phase in the DFM. The principle systematically computes
the AF techinques, detection methods, and countermeasure methods thereby facilitating a
top-level view of the validation process which would be helpful to an investigator to validate
or invalidate a DFM.
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6.7 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a novel validation principle to validate Digital Forensic Models
(DFMs) by answering RQ2, thereby addressing the research problem mentioned in 1.4. This
principle can be used to assess or negate any risks prior to the investigation that arecaused by
anti-forensic techniques. This will be useful to anyone making a validation plan or report
according to FSR-G-218 which is under the umbrella of Forensic Science Regulator (Forensic
Science Regulator, 2014) where in any risks must be assessed before proceeding to validate
a method. Also, if the rebuttal presumption of correct working of computer rule is invoked
by citing anti-forensics as the reason, then validation principle could be used to prove or
disprove the reason for invocation of that rule, that is, whether that rule is applicable to a
particular case or not. The validation principle falls on the higher layer of abstraction as seen
in figure 6.1. The reason for this is because the validation principle can only validate a DFM
if it has prior knowledge of an anti-forensic technique. It does not have the ability to predict




This chapter presents critical discussion between DNA fingerprinting method and the anti-
forensic techniques identified in the wider context. Firstly, the contributions are summarized
followed with how each of these contributions were made by answering the questions this
research has posed. Secondly, the critical evaluation compares the functionality of DNA
fingerprinting method with various memory acquisition techniques in the literature and
highlights the advantages and shortcomings. Finally, the limitations of this research are
presented along with suggested future research work directions from this study.
7.2 Summary of Contributions
The first contribution is that forensic memory acquisition can be detected on 64 bit-Windows
using memory, I/O, and CPU features. This research proposed two methods to detect memory
forensic acquistion. The first method was proposed by answering RQ1 in which various
ML classifiers were analyzed for performance using the individual and integrated MIOC
datasets respectively. After the analysis of the performance of ML classifiers on individual
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MIOC datasets, it was found that if memory is aquired using memory and I/O parameters
it outperforms when memory is being acquired by CPU parameters. Between memory and
I/O, the I/O parameters perform well for forensic memory acquisition. It was found that
by combining the MIOC parameters into a single dataset improved the performance of ML
classifiers.
The second contribution is that forensic memory acquistion can be detected by distintive
native attribute patterns using 3L-CNN. The second method proposed to detect forensic
memory acquistion was to transform the samples in the individual and integrated MIOC
datasets to images using the GSF property of the GAM. These images were then analysed
using the 3L-CNN model. The individual and integrated datasets were subjected to multi-
classification and binary classification. The individual multi-classification results show that
the 3L-CNN overfits memory parametersand underfits the CPU parameters. The model fits
I/O parameters data well. Therefore, it was concluded that when detecting forensic memory
acquisition, I/O parameters exhibit good performance. For individual binary classification,
the model again exibits high variance and overfits the memory parameters. As for I/O
parameters the model fit the data well until epoch 37. The model’s performance on CPU
parameters was found to be satifactory.
The significance of the above contribution, in the context of forensic investigation is to
create awareness to the forensic community that the forensic process could be vulnerable
to the DNA fingerprint method. Specifically, during the evidence acquisition phase, vital
or incriminating evidence could be stored in the system’s physical memory which could
be irrecoverably lost due to its volatile nature if it is not collected, unlike, for example,
evidence that can be recovered when stored on a hard-drive. If a suspect implemented the
DNA fingerprint method to detect memory acquisition, then they might have defeated the
memory acquisition process, for example, by programmatically shutting down the machine
when a forensic acquisition tool was run on the machine. Therefore, the investigator would
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have lost physical memory evidence which could have been vital to a case.
The third contribution is a novel principle that can validate digital forensic models by
counteracting anti-forensic techniques. A mathematical formalism was proposed by which
every phase in the digital forensic process is to be validated by addressing or negating any
anti-forensic techniques that influences a particular phase. Once, anti-forensic techniques
in all phases of the digital forensic process have been addressed, then by the validation
principle a digital forensic model can be validated. This study evaluates the principle with
the help of two scenarions. First by showing a proof-of-concept scenario in which a DFM is
validated. In the second scenario, two DFMs from the literature are selected as they consider
anti-forensic effects into their forensic models. The evaluation using the validation principle
has found that the models do not address anti-forensic techniques in each and every phase of
the forensic process but only focus on the analysis phase to account for anti-forensic effects.
The significance of the third contribution is that it will enable digital forensic investigators
to take the anti-forensic angle into account whilst validating their tools and processes. This
will create more confidence in their findings by ensuring validity through verification of their
tools, techniques and procedures. Therefore, assuring the reliability of digital evidence which
is one of the fundamental requirements of presenting digital evidence in the court of law.
7.3 Research Findings
This section presents the findings of the research and the extent to which each research
question(s) were answered and their corresponding objective(s) met.
1. RQ1: How can forensic memory acquisition be accurately detected by artificial intelli-
gence techniques?
Objective 1: Differentiate between forensic memory acquisition and non acquisition
by evaluating machine learning classifiers based on their accuracy, precision, and recall
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Objective 2: Compare training-validation error curves with Bias-Variance tradeoff
curves to determine if the model overfits, underfits, or fits the data well. Then, calculate
the detection error rate for each ML classifier.
Eight supervised machine learning algorithms were used to classify between forensic
memory acquisition and non-acquisition. The machine learning classifiers consists of
memory, I/O, and CPU (MIOC) features individually in separate datasets. The dataset
was split into train and validation sets and 5 k-fold cross validation was performed
to estimate the model’s skill on the data which is not present in the training set. The
samples in the dataset formed inputs to the machine learning classifiers.
Whilst analysing the results memory features dataset, the RF classifier performs well
when compared to other ML classifiers as it has precision, recall, and accuracy of
99.99 percent. To further support this evidence, its area under the ROC curve is also
maximum, and its detection error rate is less than 5 percent which is due to the fact
that it exhibits low bias and variance which means this model fits the data well.
The classifier that shows the least performance in the memory features dataset is the
Ada Boost classifier, as it has an accuracy of 29.67 percent, and a precision and recall
of 11.87 percent and 45.65 percent respectively. To further support these results, the
area under its ROC curves show that classes 3 and 5 are effected, and this model suffers
with high bias and variance with a detection error rate of 73.46 percent.
When the machine learning classifiers were learning features from the I/O dataset,
once again the RF classifier performs well when compared to the other classifiers with
precision, recall, and accuracy of 99.99 percent. This result is cross-verified with the
area of the ROC curve which is maximum for this case. This model exhibits optimal
bias and variance, and has a detection error rate of less than 5 percent, which means
this model fits the data well. The model that underperforms on I/O dataset is, Ada
Boost with accuracy of 51.5 percent and precision of 99 percent but recall of 24.56
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percent. This model exhibits high bias with a detection error rate of 23.46 percent, and
hence this model underfits the I/O dataset.
As for performance of the ML classifiers on the CPU dataset, all ML classifiers exhibit
bias which means they underfit the CPU dataset. To address this problem the memory,
I/O, and CPU datasets were combined to form an integrated dataset comprising of
20 features. In the combined feature dataset, the SVM and Ada Boost classifiers still
exhibit high bias which mean they underfit the data. Whilst, other models exhibit low
bias and variance and hence fit the data well.
Objective 5: Encode the samples in the dataset into images and classify them using
convolutional neural network (CNN). Evaluate the model’s perfomance by accuracy,
precision, recall, false positives, and false negatives.
To extract the patterns from the dataset, the time-series data was encoded using the
Gramian Summation Field property of the Gramian Angular Field. Each feature dataset,
that is, memory, I/O, and CPU comprises of 14000 images in the training set and 3500
images in the test set. These images were classified using a 3-layered convolutional
neural network (3L-CNN). To avoid overfitting, firstly the images were augmented by
random transformations, so that it can be generalised better, and the model will not see
the same image twice. Secondly, since the training dataset comprises of 14000 images
only three convolutional layers are added in this model. Adding more than three layers,
that is increasing the entropic capacity of the model, is not only time-cosuming but
also will lead to overfitting as the model will even learn the noise patters from the
datasets. Finally, a dropout layer is added after the activation layer, so that the model
does not come across the same pattern twice. Therefore, data augmentation, entropic
capacity, and dropout layer helps in reducing overfitting problems.
The 3L-CNN model was first analysed on individual MIOC datasets, and then com-
bined to analyse the multi-classification, and binary classification results. The 3L-CNN
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model has high recall but low precision, and overfits the memory features dataset. The
performance of the model on the I/O dataset shows that it has a recall and precision of
1 and 0.99 respectively. The model fits the I/O dataset well and reduces overfitting to a
greater extent. As for the CPU dataset the model suffers from low recall and precision.
The model exhibits high variance and hence overfits the CPU dataset.
After multi-classification, binary classification was performed to improve the perfor-
mance of the model on the MIOC features dataset. The model has overfit the memory
feature data set as the model exhibits variance. The model performs well on the I/O
feature dataset but it is recommened that this model must be stopped training at epoch
number 37 and from epoch 38 the testing error curve remians constant but the training
error curve starts to decrease. Therefore, the model starts to overfit the I/O feature
dataset after epoch 38. As for the CPU dataset, overall the model fits the data well,
but at epoch 20 an unusal instance is recorded. The model suffers from high bias
which is unusal because due to the nature of the dataset and preventions taken against
overfitting it is expected to see this model tackle overfitting and high variance, but not
the opposite, that is, high bias and underfitting the data. The results show that this
model overcomes underfitting after epoch 20 and continues to fit the data well.
After implementing individual classifications, integrated multi-classification and binary
classification was performed by combining the features of memory, I/O, CPU into one
single MIOC dataset. The integrated multi-classification the model underfits the data
until epoch 35, and overcomes underfitting after epoch 35 and fits the data well. This
is again unusal because the 3L-CNN model is designed to overcome overfitting and
not underfitting. As for the integrated binary classification, the models fits the MIOC
dataset well.
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7.4 Critical Evaluation
The DNA fingerprinting, which is the proposed method in this research to detect
forensic memory acquisition, will be compared to evaluate its functioning in the wider
context, that is, to the existing methods in the literature that defeat forensic memory
acquistion. In 2.3, this research has identified seven anti-forensic techniques (table 7.1)
by which live memory acquisition can be defeated.
Direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) is a technique in which the kernel objects
are manipulated to facilitate changes in the operating system (Sparks and Butler, 2005)
to the advantage of an attacker. For example, if the forward and backward link pointers
of a process are manipulated, then a process can be hidden in the memory (Fuzen,
2015). During memory acquisition or live analysis this might not flag up as suspicious
behaviour. When compared to the DNA fingerprinting method, the disadvantages of
DKOM technique are that it can be unstable that could result in a blue screen of death
(BSOD) (Fuzen, 2015). It is implemented as a kernel driver, which means in-depth
understanding of the operating system is required. At times, this could mean working
with undocumented kernel structures, and this is one of the reason that makes DKOM
unstable. DKOM attack works only on 32-bit Windows OS, it does not work on 64-bit
OS due to driver signing and kernel patch protection (KPP) (Microsoft, 2008) facility
provided on 64-bit Windows OS.
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AF Technique Mode Windows OS ML Algorithm Countermeasure
DKOM Kernel 32-bit No KPP
Virtual Address
Subversion
Kernel 32-bit No Driver Signing
Meterpreter User 32-bit No
Process handle
modification
Ddefy Kernel 32-bit No KPP
Dementia Kernel 32-bit No
Windows 8, 64-bit
and above
Memory API Hooking Kernel 32-bit No KPP
DECAF User 32-bit No
Process handle
modification
DNA Fingerprinting User 64-bit Yes Dynamic Analysis
Table 7.1 Comparison of DNA fingerprinting with AF techniques
Virtual memory subversion (VMS) technique has the ability to manipulate the content
in memory, and also be undetected by anti-virus scanners (Sparks and Butler, 2005).
A kernel driver is needed to facilitate VMS. This means it is an unstable method as it
may cause BSOD, and may not be implemented on windows 64-bit machines due to
KPP. Whereas, the DNA fingerprinting method is stable as it runs on 64-bit Windows
OS in the user-mode as opposed to kernel mode.
The rootkit Ddefy (Bilby, 2006) defeats live forensic acquistion by incepting API calls
both in user-mode and kernel-mode. In the user-mode, Ddefy performs dynamic link
library (DLL) injection, and in kernel-mode it may adopt a different strategy such as
service dispatcher table (SDT) hook or even perform a DKOM attack. The outcome
of Ddefy is after live acquisition it produces a valid image with data hidden in it,
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thus fooling the live acquisition tools. Ddefy functions on 32-bit Windows OS and
only has the ability to acquire hard-disk contents when the system is in the on-state.
Even though Ddefy and DNA fingerprinting technique are both live acquisition anti-
forensic techniques, the difference in the functionality is that the latter acquires physical
memory and the former acquires the contents of a hard-disk. DNA fingerprinting can be
extended to detect if live hard-disk forensic is taking place, but it was not investigated
during this study as it beyond the scope of this research.
Whilst Ddefy operates in the kernel and user mode to defeat live hard-disk forensic
acquisition, the anti-forensic technique Dementia (Milković, 2012) also operates in the
similar fashion to defeat live forensic memory acquisition even on 64-bit Windows OS
up until Windows 7 but only in usermode. It has the ability to hide processes, threads,
and other objects in the kernel. Dementia’s anti-forensic techniques work on 32-bit
Windows systems, and on 64-bit Windows only the user-mode method works. On the
other hand, DNA fingerprinting technique works only in the user-mode on a Windows
10 machine, and does not adopt any invasive procedures such as DLL injection to
defeat forensic memory acquisition.
Memory forensic acquisition tools at times use undocumented kernel APIs such as
MmGetPhysical memor-ranges or MmMap-MemoryDump to acquire memory. These
API calls can be intercepted to defeat memory acquisition (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013).
The shortcoming of this anti-forensic technique when compared to DNA fingerprinting
technique is that it only functions on 32-bit Window OS.
The two anti-forensic tools that specifically operate in the user-mode are DECAF
(Lim et al., 2012) and meterpreter (Kvitchko, 2015). These tools use signature based
detection technique as demonstrated in 2.4 to defeat live memory acquisition. The
shortcoming of this method is if the name of the forensic tool is changed, the signature
based method will fail to function. This is where the DNA fingerprinting addresses this
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shortcoming because it relies on the change in the MIOC-parameters to detect forensic
memory acquisition rather than the name of the forensic tool. However, there are certain
shortcomings of the DNA fingerprinting method. The DNA fingerprinting method
was studied on Windows 10, 64-bit machines with 16 GB of memory. Therefore,
arguably it may not function on differnt settings of Windows OS. The anti-forensic
techniques that work in the kernel-mode have the ability to be stealthy; whereas, since
the DNA fingerprint functions in the user-mode it does not implement measures to stay
stealthy whilst it is detecting memory acquisition. This means if a memory image is
acquired then it is likely that DNA fingerprinting method may flagged up using dynamic
analysis (Sikorski and Honig, 2012, Pg 167). However, this is debatable as it adopts
deep machine learning algorithm as seen in 5.4 to detect memory acquisition, and it
does not appear that such AI techniques have been applied in domain of anti-forensics
to detect live forensic memory acquisition as this study identified in 2.5.1.
7.5 Limitations of Study
The two memory acquisition procedures proposed in this research to detect forensic
memory acquisition are supported on windows 10 64-bit machines. They may not
be supported on other versions of Windows operating systems. The ML classifiers
used the default parameters settings from the sklearn library. Due to time and resource
constraints, hyperparameter tuning was not performed to determine the optimal values
of parameters for the underformed ML classifiers. In Chapter 5, the size of the image
was kept constant at 231x232 pixels. The 3L-CNN model was not tested too see
how the performance of the model was affected due to various image sizes. This
research only focused on detecting forensic memory acquisition, and does not focus
on defeating the live acquisition process. However, the next step would be to create
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a framework to defeat the live forensic acquisiton process which is informed by the
methods used to detect forensic memeory acquistion proposed in this research.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
This research proposed two methods by which forensic memory acquisition can be
detected. Firstly, it was hypothesized that memory acquisition can be detected if the
variation pattern of the MIOC parameters can be recognised. Therefore, ML classifiers
were used to detect the pattern variation, and it was found that Random Forest Classifier
performed well with greater accuracy, precision and recall, and exhibited optimal bias
and variance.
The other method proposed to detect forensic memory acquisition was to transform
the MIOC samples to images using the GSF property of GAF. Then 3L-CNN was used
to detect memory acquisition and non-acquisition patterns from these images with a
greater accuracy, precision and recall.
Finally, a novel principle by which DFMs can be validated was proposed. During
reviewing the literature it was found that various DFMS were being proposed by
adding and deleting phases in the DF process. Instead of developing another DFM,
this study proposes a mathematical formalisms to validate any DFM in the presence of




The proposed methods of memory forensic detection is able to support the hypothesis
in this research. However, further research has to investigate the challenges of detecting
forensic memory acquisition in real-time. The following list contains several research
ideas that can be pursued in the future as a continuation of the research presented in
this thesis:
(a) The machine learning algorithms were implemented using sklearn ML libraries
and only default parameters were enabled. One can perform the resource intensive
method of hypertuning parameters to find the suitable parameters for the ML
classifiers. This strategy may increase the accuracy, precision and recall for those
ML classifiers that have underperformed in this research work.
(b) Only the GSF property of the GAF was used to transform MIOC feature samples
to images. Other ways to transform MIOC features to images are GDF property
of the GAF, and MTF to name a few. These transformations can be compared
with each other to find out which transformation is most suited to the task of
detecting forensic memory acquisition.
(c) The datasets produced in this research can be used as a baseline to be compared
with other emerging datasets to detect forensic memory acquisiton.
(d) The python code can be turned to an executable file and then reverse engineered
to ascertain how AI algorithms work in memory. This could open new doors in
the field malware analysis-AI malware research.
(e) The mathematical principle proposed to validate DFMs by negating AF attacks
can be implemented in a programming language and then evaluated as a proof-of-
concept system.
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Non-paged Pool Amount of memory a process is using that cannot be moved out to the pagefile and remains in memory.
Numpage The number of pagefaults
Paged_Pool Amount of memory a process is using in pageable memory region.
Pagefile The data that is not stored in the physical memory
Peak_nonpaged_pool Maximum value of nonpaged pool in bytes
Peak_paged_pool Maximum value of paged pool in bytes
Peak_pagefile Maximum value of pagefile
Peak_wset Peak value of Wset
Unique set size (USS) Memory that is freed when a process terminates. Every process has its own USS.
Wset The non-swapped memory a process has utilised. It is also known as resident set size.






Read_count Number of read operations performed
Write_count Number of write operations performed
Read_bytes Number of bytes read
Write_bytes Number of bytes written
Other_count Number of operations other than read and write
Other_bytes Number of bytes transferred other than read and write operations




Kernel Amount of time CPU spends in kernel-mode
User Amount of time CPU spends in user-mode.
Blocking The time that is elapsed before and after the interval
Non-blocking The time elapsed since last function call or module import
Table C.2 CPU Parameters
Appendix D
Memory Parameters Evaluation Metrics






Table D.1 Memory Multiclassification Evaluation Metrics
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Table D.2 Memory Binary-classification Evaluation Metrics
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Table D.3 IO Multiclassification Evaluation Metrics
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Table D.4 I/O Binary-classification Evaluation Metrics
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Table D.5 CPU Multiclassification Evaluation Metrics
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False Positives 449 91
False Negatives 265 36
Table D.6 CPU Binary Classification Metrics
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Table D.7 Integrated Multiclassification Metrics
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False Positives 449 91
False Negatives 265 36
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